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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
The compulsory acquisition refers to situations where the minority shareholders are 
compelled to dispose of their shares. In certain instances the minority shareholders 
can compel the majority to acquire their shares by an enforced acquisition. The 
compulsory aspect is thus the unilateral and coercive aspect of the transaction that 
can arise subject to the fulfilment of certain statutory and regulatory requirements. 
These transactions are commonly known as squeeze-outs or freeze-outs, whereas sell 
outs is where minority shareholders have the right to have their shares acquired by 
the company on a compulsory basis. 
 
In this dissertation the argument will be made that the objective of these forms of 
transactions is to relieve the majority or controlling shareholder from undue 
oppression by the minority shareholders not only in instances of control transferred 
squeeze outs but also in respect to control maintained transactions. 
 
The dissertation will focus on the three main forms of squeeze-out transactions being 
the tender offer squeeze-out, the squeeze-out by means of a fundamental transaction 
and the supermajority squeeze-out transaction. The emphasis will be on how the first 
two forms of transactions are implemented in the South African context and a case 
will be made to include the final form in t out legal framework. A specific emphasis 
will be given to the regulation of these transactions in ensuing the fairness to the 
affected minority shareholders. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
At its core company law seeks to manage three basic relationships: between 
shareholders and directors, between shareholders, directors and other stakeholders 
and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.1 The management 
of the third relationship is not more evident than in instances where there is a 
compulsory acquisition of minority shareholding. 
 
The compulsory acquisition refers to situations where the minority shareholders are 
compelled to dispose of their shares. In certain instances the minority shareholders 
can compel the company to acquire their shares by means of an enforced acquisition. 
The compulsory aspect is thus the unilateral and coercive aspect of the transaction 
that can arise subject to the fulfilment of certain statutory and regulatory 
requirements.2  
 
In recognising this form of transaction two rights have been developed, namely the 
squeeze-out right and a sell-out right. The squeeze-out right is where the controlling 
shareholder, or outside acquirer, after fulfilling the requirements, is able to acquire 
the remaining minority shareholding.3 The minority shareholders are thus effectively 
squeezed-out of the company, hence the mechanism is commonly known as a 
„squeeze-out‟ or „freeze-out‟. The sell-out right is where after the occurrence of 
certain events, or fulfilment of certain requirements, the minority shareholders are 
able to force the acquirer or company to acquire the minorities‟ shareholding.  
 
The justification of this form of expropriation and forced acquisition of minority 
shareholding is based on policy taking into account interests of both parties. In some 
instances the value of minority shareholding may be artificially adjusted, (in favour 
of minority shareholders), as a result of a takeover transaction and in other instances 
minority shareholders may be trapped in an investment with a dominant controlling 
                                                        
1 H Hansmann & R Kraakman „The Basic Governance Structure in Kraakman et al „The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2004) 33 
2 This form of transaction hereinafter known as „compulsory acquisitions‟ 
3 Shareholding will refer any form of applicable securities, not simply equity shareholding 
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shareholder. The mechanism allowing compulsory acquisition of minority 
shareholding may thus present relief for parties in such situations. 
 
The squeeze-out mechanism has however been described to be the both a „visible and 
palpable manifestations of the controller‟s raw power within the corporate legal 
framework‟.4 The role of regulation in this area is thus important in the fair treatment 
of the affected minority shareholders and recognising the majority rule principle in 
the management of companies. The main goal in the context of compulsory 
acquisitions should be to enhance socially desirable control transfer and control 
consolidation mechanisms in companies. 
 
The South African corporate framework has been reformed by the advent of the 
Companies Act, 2008.5 In the context of compulsory acquisitions there has been 
significant developments made in takeover law. The innovations (drawn from foreign 
jurisdictions but adapted for the South African jurisdiction) includes a statutory 
merger procedure, that was previously not part of the corporate framework, as well as 
an appraisal rights remedy for shareholders who oppose a fundamental change in a 
company in the form of corporate control transactions. 
 
The key aim of this dissertation is to firstly investigate the principles surrounding 
compulsory acquisitions in order to establish the justification and objective of these 
transactions (primarily in the context statutory squeeze-out mechanisms rather than 
indirect oppressive methods) by examining the origins and policy considerations. 
This includes the basis of fairness in respect to the regulation of these forms of 
transactions. The focus will then shift to critically analysing the three main squeeze-
out mechanisms in assessing whether the said objectives are achieved and adequate 
regulation is applied. The analysis will be done from a South African perspective, but 
will include comparative analysis from foreign jurisdictions where required. 
 
 
                                                        
4 V Khanna & U Varottil „Regulating Squeeze Outs In India: A Comparative Perspective‟ National 
University of Singapore Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper 2014/009, July 2014, 4 
5 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (effective date 1 May 2011), hereinafter „the Act‟ 
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The structure of the dissertation is, as mentioned above divided primarily in 
establishing the basis of compulsory acquisitions and the analysis of the three 
primary squeeze-out mechanisms, being the tender offer squeeze-out, the 
fundamental transaction squeeze-out and the supermajority squeeze-out type. The 
sell-out rights of minority shareholders will also be examined in the context of each 
type of squeeze-out mechanism.  
 
Chapter two of the dissertation focuses on basis of the squeeze-out mechanism, 
whereby the historical development of the mechanism will be examined. The chapter 
will then look at the policy consideration that advocates for the mechanism and the 
consideration that sets out why the mechanism must be regulated. An argument will 
be made that the objective of compulsory acquisitions should not be limited to 
control-transfer type but should also include the control-maintained type of squeeze-
out. The control-transferred type is geared towards outside acquirers attempting to 
obtain full ownership of a company whereas control-maintained type is where the 
incumbent controlling shareholders want to eliminate minority shareholders.6  The 
objective of this chapter is establishing the objective of the mechanism that enables 
an analysis of current types of mechanisms of achieving the said objective. 
 
In chapter three the‘tender offer squeeze-out‟ type will be discussed. The core 
elements of the mechanism will be discussed thereafter the South African use of this 
type of squeeze-out will be examined in depth. Where issues arise they will be 
compared to jurisdictions also employing this form of squeeze-out. In particular the 
calculation of the threshold of acceptances will be compared with the European and 
New Zealand jurisdictions. We will thereafter examine the regulation of this type of 
squeeze-out in particular cases involving minority shareholders challenging the 
transaction on the basis of fairness. 
 
 
                                                        
6 HJ Rho „New Squeeze-Out Devices as part of Corporate Law Reform in Korea: What type of Device 
is required for a developing economy?‟ Boston University International Law Journal at 59 
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Chapter four will examine the application of the squeeze-out mechanism in what is 
known in South African law as fundamental transactions. 7  The applicable 
fundamental transactions in this case will be the so-called „freeze-out merger‟ 
transactions and the scheme of arrangement. A focus will be given on how the 
legislature has set out protection of minority shareholders who are subject to these 
transactions. A comparative analysis of protections devices as set out in Delaware 
jurisdictions will be made in respect of freeze-out mergers. The dissident shareholder 
appraisal right will also be discussed in the context of a minority protection device. 
Ultimately an examination will be made of whether there is sufficient protection to 
minority shareholders in terms of the Act and other applicable regulations. 
 
In chapter five the ‘ supermajority squeeze-out’  type of mechanism will be 
analysed. This form of squeeze-out is a pure control-maintained type of squeeze out 
and is not provided for in the South African corporate legal framework. Its main 
requirement is that if a controlling shareholder acquires a certain threshold of holding 
then it is able to squeeze out the remaining minority shareholders. It is thus not 
contingent on the making of a takeover bid or concluding a fundamental transaction 
but is an independent squeeze-out mechanism. Three mechanisms will be examined 
being the short form merger as provided in the Delaware jurisdiction, the expulsion 
of minority shareholders mechanism as provided in the German jurisdiction and the 
dominant owner mechanism as provided in the New Zealand jurisdiction. The 
reasoning of why this mechanism should be considered in the South African 
jurisdiction will be discussed by identifying possible issues pertaining to the interplay 
of sections in the Act that may result in the objectives of the compulsory acquisitions 
not being achieved. 
 
Chapter six will contain the conclusion of the analysis where all the main issues of 
the in each chapter will be identified and discussed. In order to achieve the objectives 
set out in chapter two, proposals for consideration will be presented for consideration 
and to be possibly incorporated in the current South African corporate framework. 
 
 
                                                        
7 See Chapter 5 of the Act 
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2  THE BASIS FOR COMPULSORY ACQUISITIONS  
 
2 1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter the justification and objective of compulsory acquisitions doctrine be 
investigated. The origins of the doctrine will be traced in order to understand its 
development in the corporate legal framework. In doing so we will investigate the 
origins in the United Kingdom jurisdiction, (UK), and the United States jurisdiction, 
(US), by firstly through its development in common law through to codification of 
squeeze-out devices.  
 
The origin of the South African statutory squeeze-out device is derived or 
predominately sourced from the same or similar provisions in the UK Companies 
legislation.8 It is also important to examine the development of the doctrine in the 
US, as it will provide further context to the doctrine. Also many of the new 
innovations of the Act are either derived or similar to provisions in the US.9  
 
This chapter will further focus on the policy considerations surrounding the doctrine 
of compulsory acquisitions. The legal aspects of corporate law such as the nature of 
shareholding and the majority rule principle will be examined. This section will also 
deal with the factors favouring the squeezing-out of minority shareholders such as the 
advantages of full ownership and the possible artificial value of certain holding as 
consequence of takeover transactions.  
 
The examination will also look at the limitations of the justifications of the 
compulsory acquisitions by making a case for the regulation of the doctrine. In this 
                                                        
8 See s130ter of Companies Act of 1926 first inserted by s65 of the Amendment Act of 1939 which 
correspond with s155 of the English Companies Act of 1929,also see Mia v Anglo-Alpha Cement Ltd 
1970 (2) 281 at 283; Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 631; P 
Delport, and Q Vorster, „Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 Volume 1 (2012) at 433; 
Haslam and Others v Seflana Employee Benefits Organisation 1998 (4) SA 964 (W) at 967-969; Vlok 
N.O. and Others v Sun International South Africa Ltd and Others 2011 at para 2 & 24 
9 MF Cassim „The Introduction of the Statutory Merger In South African Corporate Law: Majority 
Rule Offset by the Appraisal Right (Part 1) (2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 1 
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section the underlying factors recognising the unequal bargaining powers will be 
identified in order to determine the objectives of the regulation of the squeeze-outs. 
 
2 2 Historical overview of Compulsory Acquisitions 
 
2 2 1 Common Law development 
 
The law regarding squeeze outs appears to be founded on different grounds in respect 
of the UK and US jurisdictions respectively as to the predominant right that it 
protected.10 
 
In early US common law, the courts viewed share ownership as a form of vested right 
that could not be taken without consent. Therefore, all shareholders not only had the 
rights to retain their shares in a corporation but also had a right to veto any 
fundamental change in the nature of the corporation or the terms of its existence.11 
The basis of the so-called veto rule was on the view that the charter or memorandum 
or incorporation was a contract, both among the company‟s shareholders and between 
the company and the state, in which every shareholder has a vested right.12 As such 
the US recognised shares as property rights which the can only be acquired with the 
consent of the minority, the majority was also powerless to overcome the minority‟s 
dissent and the only way to overcome them was to purchase the minority shares per 
agreement. 
 
The common law in the US, however started to recognise that the rule of unanimity, 
as stated above, created intolerable holdout problems and frustrated many efficient 
corporate transactions. As a result of these issues the rule was ultimately extinguished 
in favour of a rule that allowed majority shareholders to squeeze-out minority 
                                                        
10 P Spender Compulsory Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings (1993) 11 C&SLJ at 85. 
11 Spender op cit (n10) at 85 
12 EJ Weiss, „The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective‟ 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 627 
(1981); Rho op cit (n6) at 43 
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shareholders. 13  The new rule that was developed however was part of a further 
development in US Law whereby it was recognised the principle of the majority 
shareholders owing the minority shareholders a fiduciary obligation in handling the 
latters property.  
  
The UK courts tended to allow free reign of the management of a company on the 
basis that shareholders were allowed to sell their shares if they did not agree with the 
manner of management. The common law evolved on the principle of fraud on the 
minority. The principle of fraud on the minority is where there is improper exercise 
of voting power by the majority of shareholders of a company. It is the evidence of 
failure to cast votes for the benefit of the company as a whole. A majority in control 
of a company perpetrates a fraud on the minority. A resolution passed upon such 
voting is voidable. For example, a resolution for alteration of the articles of 
association to allow the compulsory purchase of the minority‟s shares against their 
wishes.14 
 
Although the majority owes no fiduciary duty to the minority the doctrine of fraud on 
the minority will invalidate any apparent regular exercise of power to alter the 
relationship that is really a means of securing some personal gain. The power to 
remove shareholding of the minority must be exercised bona fide for the benefit of 
the company as a whole.15 This principle seems similar to the shareholder protection 
provision of the Act which provides relief from prejudicial conduct relating the 
separate personality of a company.16  
 
The problem with this principle and balancing the interests of the majority and the 
minority is the determination of what exactly is meant by „to the benefit as a 
company as a whole. A clear illustration of this dilemma is the matter of Brown v 
British Abrasive Wheel Co.17  
                                                        
13 Spender op cit (n10) at 85; also FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel „Corporate Control Transactions‟ 
(1982) 91 Yale LJ 698 at 723.  
14 Phillips v Manufacturers Securities Ltd (1917) 116 L.T. 290 
15 Spender op cit (n10) at 85, Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch.656 
16 s163 of the Act 
17 [1919] 1 Ch 290 
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In the Brown matter the company was in dire need of a capital injection in order to 
avoid being liquidated as being the only viable alternative. The majority was willing 
to provide the capital however only if they could aquire full control of the company. 
The minority was however not willing to sell their shares. The majority then 
attempted to amend the articles of incorporation in order to effectively squeeze-out 
the minority. This attempt was failed since it was only to the benefit of the majority 
and not to the company as a whole. It is however difficult not to assume that avoiding 
liquidation would not be to the benefit of the company as a whole. 
 
2 2 2 Codification of Compulsory Acquisition Devices 
 
It became clear that the above common law principles was not adequate in dealing 
with the balance of interests between the minority and majority shareholders. In the 
US the response by the legislators was by introducing merger statute frameworks 
which in certain cases provided the majority to squeeze-out the minority 
shareholdings.18 The most noteble merger form enabling squeeze-out mechanisms 
was the short form merger.19 This is also known as the parent company subsidiary 
company merger. How it works is if the holding company reaches a certain threshold 
(in the state of Delaware it is 90 per cent) of shares held in a subsidiary company it 
may effect a merger with the subsidiary in order to squeeze-out the minority 
shareholders. The requirement in order to effect such a merger is a simple board 
resolution from the holding company. 
 
The merger framework also provided for a long form merger where the shareholding 
of a holding company was below the said threshold or any two companies could form 
a merger and effectively squeeze-out minority shareholding. The requirement here 
would however is much more complex and onerous including shareholding meeting 
                                                        
18 While Florida enacted the first cash-out merger statute in the mid 1920s, freeze-outs only became 
commonplace when the Delaware and Model Business Corporation Act made similar provisions in the 
1950s and 1960s respectively see G Subramanian „Fixing Freezeouts‟ (2005) 115 Yale Law Journal 2, 
10 at 8 
19 A state example currently is s253 Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) 
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and resolution, proxy statement and prospectus form to be filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.20 
 
The lawmakers however recognised in allowing such transactions that there must be 
regulation in order to avoid abuse against the minority who are being squeezed out. 
Thus in both forms of mergers the minority shareholders were granted the right of 
dissenting shareholder appraisal rights, whereby they can approach the court to 
determine the fair value of their holdings. 
 
The UK, (and evidently South Africa‟s), framework regarding a legislative squeeze-
out mechanism is sourced from the recommendations of the Greene Committee.21 
The committee stated the following in respect to issue of dissenting minority 
shareholders to takeovers and schemes of amalgamations: 
 
‘The acquiring company generally desires to obtain the whole of the share 
capital of the company which is being taken over and in some cases will not 
entertain the business except on that basis. 
 
It has been represented to us that holders of a small number of shares in the 
company which is being taken over (either from a desire to exact better terms 
than their fellow shareholders content to accept or from a lack of real interest in 
the matter) frequently fail to come to an arrangement which commends itself to 
the vast majority of fellow shareholders, with the result that the transaction fails 
to materialise.  
 
In our opinion this position- which is in effect an oppression of the majority by a 
minority- should be met.’22 
 
 
Based on the above statement the committee made the following recommendation: 
                                                        
20 Spender op cit (n10) at 86, M Lipton and E Steinberger „Takeovers and Freezeouts (1978) Law 
Journal Seminar Press, New York, p 422-423, s262 of DGCL 
21 The Greene Committee was set up by the United Kingdom‟s Board of Trade to examine and review 
Company Law in the United Kingdom. Also known as the Company Law Amendment Committee 
22 Board of Trade, Company Law Amendment Committee Report (1925 – 1926) at p 43 
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‘III. Where a scheme of amalgamation involving the transfer or a class of shares 
has been sanctioned by the holders of at least 90 per cent. Of the shares 
involved, the purchasing concern should be entitled as of a right within a limited 
time to acquire the shares of non-assenting holders on the same terms as those 
accepted by the assenting shareholders, with a right of appeal to the Court on 
any question of value or oppression.’23 
 
 
It is clear thus the recommendation was based on the principle that the minority 
should not be able to oppress the majority.24 The above recommendation lead to the 
additional provision in the UK company legislation,25 which provided in essence that 
where 90 per cent acceptances were received for a takeover offer the remaining 
shareholders who have not accepted may be purchased by the offeror on the same 
terms as the original offer. As this provision evolved it also allowed for a sell out 
provision that enabled the minority shareholders where the offer was accepted by 90 
per cent of the other shareholders to force the offeror to purchase their shares on the 
same terms as the original offer.26 
 
2 3 The Basis for Compulsory Acquisitions 
 
In this section the considerations for the basis of squeeze-outs or compulsory 
acquisitions will be analysed. The said factors can be divided into two groups being 
the legal nature of minority shareholders in terms of the corporate law framework and 
the justifications of squeeze-outs from a commercial side to the benefit of the 
company as whole. In terms of both these groups it will be argued that the basis for 
compulsory acquisitions is valid. A conclusion will be sought in respect of what 
exactly the objectives of the squeeze-outs are in order to determine whether it is 
achieved by implementing the devices analysed. 
 
                                                        
23 Board of Trade op cit (n21) at p 44-45 
24 MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, M Larkin, CH Rademeyer & YL Yeats Commentary on 
the Companies Act Looseleaf (2003) Vol 3 at 15A-143 
25 S155 of the Company Act of 1929 
26 See s983 of Companies Act 2006 a 
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2 3 1 Legal Basis   
 
2 3 1 1  Limited rights of a shareholder 
 
The Act recognises a share as moveable property, which is transferable in any 
manner as provided by the Act or other legislation.27 What is required for purposes of 
the squeeze-out provisions is to determine the nature of the rights afforded to the 
holder of the share being property and whether such rights can be limited. 
 
The legal nature of shareholding has been explained as the following: 
 
‘Shares are a bundle of intangible property rights property rights shareholders 
receive from the company in return for their contribution of cash or non-cash 
assets to the company. Shares define and allocate (a) income rights ie rights of 
participation in the company’s cashflow, usually in the form of a dividend; (b) 
the incidence of the risk of loss, usually in the form of priority rights in relation 
to capital; and (c) power of control principally through voting rights. Shares are 
classified according to income, capital and control rights. The definition and 
allocation of these rights is an integral part of shares. By the reason of 
ownership of a share, a shareholder becomes the owner of an intangible 
property right in a company made up of income, capital and voting rights, all 
determined by the terms of the issue of the share, the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation, the general law and applicable statutes of the place (ie country) 
of incorporation of the company. Shares are the units into which shareholders’ 
rights of participation in the company’s cash flow, management and on a return 
of capital and dividend.’ 28 
 
In line with the above explanation it has further been recognised shares are jus in 
personam, rights in action, whereby the extent and nature of the ownership is 
                                                        
27 S35 of the Act 
28 F Oditah „Takovers, Share Exchanges and the Meaning of Loss‟ (1996) LQR 424 at 426-7; FHI 
Cassim, (managing ed); MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste; J Shev, and J Yeates, Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 214 
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dependent on the provisions set out in the statute. 29  The rights in respect to 
shareholding can thus be described as a bundle of personal rights. The extent of 
personal rights afforded to the shareholder in respect to personal rights of the 
ownership is subject to limitations as prescribed by the Act, in this squeezing-out 
must be seen as limitation of the right to ownership.  
 
The argument is based on the right to ownership fails to recognise the distinction 
between unique nature of a share as intangible and that of other tangible properties of 
the company. Shareholders do not directly control the underlying assets of a 
company, the value of which is reflected in the shares, but focus upon their shares 
market value. The share value is a reflection of the company and the features of are 
subject of the company‟s performance.30  
 
The limited nature of shareholding have been bluntly illustrated by Carney & 
Heimendinger as the following: 
 
‘Minority shareholders [in the US] do not have a right to remain shareholders – 
however willing they may be – in the face of majority voting rules on questions 
as asset sales, liquidations, mergers and reverse stock splits’31 
 
The limited nature of shareholding is simply a result of the commercial reality to the 
functioning of a company and the unique rights pertaining to shareholding. 
 
2 3 1 2 Majoritarian Shareholder Rule Principle 
 
It is company law principle that the majority shareholders will in some way have 
supremacy over the minority in order for the proper functioning of a company. 
Resolutions of the shareholders are based on majority rule and only in exceptional 
circumstances will unanimous approval be required. Trollip JA confirmed this 
                                                        
29 Liquidators, Union Share Agency v Hatton 1927 AD 240 at 250 
30 Rho op cit (n6) at 49 
31 WJ Carney & M Heimendinger „ Appraising the Nonextinct: The Delaware Courts‟ Struggle with 
Control Premium 152 U PA L Rev (2003) 845 
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principle, in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd32 whereby he stated the 
following: 
 
‘By becoming a shareholder in a company a person undertakes by his contract to 
be bound by the decisions of the prescribed majority of shareholders, if those 
decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at in accordance with law, 
even where they adversely affect his own rights as a shareholder. That principle 
of the supremacy of the majority is essential to the proper functioning of 
companies.’33  
 
The framework of modern company is based on proper governance that can only be 
done by allowing certain decision to the majority and not a unanimous consent. In 
allowing this it leads to effective management where shareholder resolutions are 
required. The position of a minority shareholder is thus intrinsically inferior to that of 
the controlling or majority shareholder. 
 
2 3 2 Commercial Basis 
 
As stated above the limitation on minority shareholders personal rights, by allowing, 
in certain circumstances, for the compulsory acquisition of their shares is based on 
policy considerations. The point of departure is thus whether such intervention is 
desirable or necessary. 
 
It would seem that the inclusion of squeeze-out rules, sell out rights or appraisal 
rights into takeover regulation serves the purpose of mitigating types of opportunistic 
behaviour. Firstly, takeover regulation should help restrain opportunistic managerial 
behaviour in the dispersed ownership system. Small shareholders lack the incentives 
to effectively monitor management and rely on different mechanisms of external 
control. Thus the desired purpose is to protect or allow those who effectively manage 
the company to do so effectively without unnecessary barriers. Secondly on the other 
hand there must be a level of protection afforded to the minority shareholders noting 
                                                        
32 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining supra (n8) 
33  Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining supra (n8) at 678, confirmed in Vlok NO v Sun 
International South Africa supra (n8) at para 68 
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that they have a right to their investment even though they do not have such a role in 
management or control. The exit should be on, to certain degree, on fair terms.34  
 
In elaborating on the objective of the regulation we will look at the established 
justification for the general public interest which need to be guarded and lastly what 
exactly needs to be protected in respect of the dissenting minority on their exit. 
 
2 3 2 1  Free-Rider Problem 
 
The most recognised theoretical justification for the squeeze-out rule or principle is 
known as the free rider problem. Grossman and Hart 35  studied the dynamics of 
control allocations and this analysis provides for a fundamental framework for the 
squeeze-out and sells out right for the optimal functioning of the ownership and 
transfer of ownership of corporations. The theory of the free rider problem will be 
discussed hereunder. 
 
When a tender offer is made the shareholders of the target company will infer that the 
acquiring company must believe that the target company is worth more than the 
tender offer price otherwise the acquiring company will not have made the tender 
offer and the efforts to acquire the shares of the target company. The assumption is 
thus that when the bidder will be in control the returns will be greater. The strategy of 
the target company shareholders will thus be to hold the shares and not accept the 
tender offer. They will thus „free ride‟ on the targets company‟s efforts to realise the 
higher value. If every target shareholder believes that her decision not to accept will 
not affect the offer‟s likelihood of success, no one will tender, no offer will succeed 
and the market for corporate control will run dry. The argument is thus the ability to 
squeeze-out dissident minorities is necessary to discourage free riding.  
 
 
                                                        
34 C Van der Elst & L Van Den Steen „Opportunities in the M&A aftermarket squeezing out and 
selling out‟ Universiteit Gent Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2006-12 at pg 6 
35  SJ Grossman & OD Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 11 Bell Journal of Economics 42, 43 (1980); Van der Elst op cit (n34) at 7, also RJ 
Gilson & BS Black „The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions‟ 2ed (1995) at 1238 
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2 3 2 2  Advantages of full control of a company 
 
The exclusive control offers a number of advantages for example general meetings 
can be organised as the acquirer thinks appropriate (like a written general meeting), if 
there are no minorities that can ask questions at the general meeting of shareholders. 
In short, retaining a small number of shareholders can be costly.   The ability to 
squeeze-out minority shareholders and thus obtain 100 per cent of the equity of a 
corporation is a basic condition for current market for corporations as full control is 
seen as acquisition planning.36  The reason why there is the necessity to acquire all 
the equity in a company is the advantages of such a position and the notion that the 
ability to exploit these advantages should not be unreasonably being prevented. We 
will hereunder examine the said advantages of full control of a company also in 
particular from a take over market perspective. 
 
i Access to assets of target company 
 
In takeover transactions it is not uncommon for an acquiring company to be 
dependent on the access to a target company assets in order to pay off the debt 
incurred to finance the acquisition. If minority shareholders a are not eliminated, the 
argument goes, then whether what is sought is the company‟s existing cash, or the 
proceeds of the of post-acquisition sales is the target company assets, the price of the 
acquiring company‟s access to those resources is the distribution of a proportionate 
amount to any remaining minority shareholders.37  
 
ii Delisting 
 
A possible reason for needing the eliminate minority shareholders is simply cost 
considerations associated with having minority shareholders. The squeeze out 
provision can assist greatly in the process of delisting or going private. Being a public 
company listed on an exchange not only cost money to the exchange it also brings 
                                                        
36 Van Der Elst op cit (n34) at 9 
37 Gilson op cit (n35) at 1239 
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about significant compliance obligations with not only company legislation but also 
with regulations pertaining to exchanges. There is thus at times incentive for 
companies to delist or to become private companies. 
 
A successful takeover does not necessarily allow the bidder delisting the target and 
fully integrate the acquired company. A squeeze out helps this process if the relation 
between the different legal instruments is not disputed.38  
 
In the South African context the voluntary delisting from the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) is done in terms of a procedure set out in the JSE Listing 
Requirements.39 The process is a fairly onerous approach whereby amongst others the 
                                                        
38 Van Der Elst op cit (n34) at 9 
39 JSE Listing Requirements para 1.13 – 1.16: 
Removal at the request of issuer 
1.13  An issuer may make written application to the JSE for a removal of any of its securities from 
the List, stating from which time and date it wishes the removal to be effective. The JSE may 
grant the request for removal, provided paragraphs 1.14 and 1.15 are properly complied with 
and perfected. 
 
1.14  Prior to being able to effect paragraph 1.13, an issuer must send a circular to the holders of its 
securities complying not only with the requirements of paragraph 11.1 (contents of all 
circulars) but also with the following:  
(a)  where the issuer is a listed company, approval must be obtained from shareholders in 
general meeting for the removal of the listing prior to the issuer making written 
application for such removal; 
  (b)  the reasons for removal must be clearly stated; 
(c)  an offer (which must be fair in terms of paragraph 1.14(d)) must be made to all 
holders of listed securities with terms and conditions provided in full; and 
(d)  a statement must be included by the board of directors confirming that the offer is 
fair insofar as the shareholders (excluding any related party/ies if it/they are equity 
securities holders) of the issuer are concerned and that the board of directors has 
been so advised by an independent expert acceptable to the JSE. The board of 
directors must obtain a fairness opinion (which must be included in the circular), 
prepared in accordance with Schedule 5, before making this statement. 
 
1.15  Where approval is required in terms of paragraph 1.14(a), more than 50% of the votes of all 
shareholders present or represented by proxy at the general meeting, excluding any 
controlling shareholder, its associates and any party acting in concert, and any other party 
which the JSE deems appropriate, must be cast in favour of such resolution, unless the JSE 
otherwise decides. 
 
1.16  Shareholder approval for the removal of the listing need not be sought, and a circular need not 
be sent to the holders of securities where the listing of such securities is intended to be 
removed: 
 (a)  following a take-over offer, the securities have become subject to Section 124 of the 
Act and notice has been given by the offeror of its intention to cancel the listing of 
the securities (in these circumstances) in the initial offer document or in any 
subsequent circular sent to holders of securities; or 
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shareholder approval and a regulated offer for holdings are required. The procedure 
however makes specific exceptions whereby the abovementioned process is not 
required this makes specific reference to the tender offer squeeze out provision in 
terms of s124 of the Act and other takeover mechanisms.40 It is thus clear the ability 
of compulsory acquisition of minority shareholding is vital in the process of 
voluntarily delisting from an exchange and in this case the JSE. 
 
iii Gains from synergy 
 
One of the main incentives from acquiring full control of a company is to avoid 
unnecessary obstructions from operating a company. This is important from a group 
context of companies. In a group of companies the board of directors of the fully 
controlled subsidiary can align the management of the subsidiary with the groups 
strategy and subordinate the interest of the subsidiary. If however there are a minority 
shareholding the board of directors will be compelled to take into account the 
interests of those shareholders in its decision procedures. It can therefore possibly 
stifle the objective of a certain acquisition or cause undue consideration to 
smallholding. 
 
Synergy gains from pivotal considerations in respect to acquisition factors. In groups 
of companies it can be difficult to structure the development of new activities if the 
group management must take into account the interests of the minority shareholder.41 
 
 
2 4  The Basis for Regulation 
 
 
The role of regulation in respect of compulsory acquisitions is the balancing of 
interests of both parties. The coercive nature of the said transaction requires the law 
to ensure that affected minority shareholders are treated fairly. In this section the 
factors that may lead to opportunistic behaviour and abuse of the compulsory 
                                                                                                                                                              
 (b)  following the completion of a scheme of arrangement with shareholders, in terms of 
Sections 114 and 115 of the Act, as a result of which either all the shares have been 
acquired or the JSE is satisfied that the issuer no longer qualifies for listing (the JSE 
must be consulted for a ruling in this regard). 
40 Ibid para 1.16 
41 Gilson op cit (n35) at 1246-1247 
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acquisition devices are identified in order to ensure that occurrence of such factors 
are controlled. 
 
 
2 4 1 Conflict of interests 
 
 
Squeeze-out transaction can create a potential conflict of interests between 
controlling and minority shareholders. The reason is that squeeze outs are mainly 
recognised as self-dealing transactions. 
 
Self-dealing occurs when one takes an action in an official capacity which involves 
dealing oneself in a private capacity and which confers a benefit on oneself. In a 
corporate context, an officer or other fiduciary who takes advantage of his or her 
position by putting self interests before, rather than after, the principle‟s (eg 
shareholders) interests during the course of a specific transaction engages in a self-
dealing transaction. 
 
The controlling shareholders ability to abuse the managerial power of a corporation 
to the detriment of the minority shareholders creates a serious conflict of interests 
between the controlling and the minority shareholders themselves. The minority 
shareholders are left facing the risk of a freeze out. In such a context, the minority 
shareholders may be the victims of the real rights conferred on controlling 
shareholders: after a controlling shareholder has exerted these rights, it is the minority 
shareholders who are ejected from the firm.42  
 
The inherent conflict of interest may lead to opportunistic squeeze out transaction 
that might be unduly unfair to minority shareholders. This is a result of the so called 
„lemons effect‟ in business transactions. A „lemon effect‟ is created when controllers 
are able to use their own private information to establish a squeeze-out terms 
favourable to the controller. This information may be the acquisition of a very 
valuable contract to the benefit of the company which the minority and market is not 
aware of. Under a regime where the squeezed-out minority shareholders receive 
                                                        
42 L Pinta „The U.S. and Italy: Controlling Shareholders‟ Fiduciary duties in Freeze Out Mergers and 
Tender Offers‟ (2011) NYU Journal of Law & Business Vol 7 931 at 933 
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compensation equal to the pre squeeze-out market prices to be set at a level below the 
no squeeze-out value of minority shares.43 
 
 
2 4 2  Investment concerns of minority 
 
 
The holding of shares in a company is an investment in that company most 
commonly for growth in the initial investment. It can therefore be seen that the 
concept of the share is a risk taking and to a certain degree the holder of the share 
should be allowed prerogative in respect to that risk taking. The concern in respect to 
squeeze-outs is that the minority shareholder loses control of his or her investment 
even against their will. 
 
A controller might decide to pursue a squeeze-out knowing that the target is about to 
receive a very profitable opportunity and thus denying the minorities the ability to 
share in those profits, even though it can in certain cases be argued that the said 
opportunity only arose because of the initial risk taken by all shareholders. A 
controller can also propose a squeeze-out right after a stock market decline in order to 
take advantage of the targets lower market price, even though the lower price may be 
transitory. There is some suggestion that the going private wave of the 1970‟s in the 
United States was an example of this.44 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
43 LA Bebchuk & M Kahan „ Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts‟ 
Concentrated Corporate Ownership [Textbook title] 247 -264 (Randall K Morck ed., 2000) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=147568 
44 Khanna op cit (n4) at 7, Also see A.A. Sommer, Jr., Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame 
Law School, Nov. 1974, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/111474sommer.pdf 
accessed on 1 September 2015, specifically at 17 where the commissioner stated the following: ‘
Speaking only for myself, I find it very difficult to believe that the use of the tactics I have discussed in 
order to freeze out minority shareholders or deprive them of a market for their stock or the protection 
of the federal securities laws, really constitute protection of them or contribute anything to the 
integrity of the market place.’ 
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2 4 3  Exit Mechanisms: Sell-Out Rights 
 
As stated in the introduction the sell-out right afforded to minority shareholders is a 
device whereby they can coerce the controlling shareholder or the new acquirer to 
purchase their holdings. The sell-out right can also be utilised in the form of 
shareholder appraisal right whereby if there is a fundamental change in the company 
that a certain shareholder objects he may be cashed out and consideration is 
determined by court intervention. 
 
In the tender offer squeeze-out the sell out right is mainly utilised as an exit 
mechanism. On the same principle as the mandatory offer provision it affords a 
shareholder to withdraw from his or her investment due to effective control being 
afforded to a certain shareholder and can be viewed as a fundamental change in the 
functioning of the business. The use of the sell-out right in tender offers is the 
recognition that the squeeze-out is inevitably a choice by the controller and as such 
the minority shareholder should also be afforded the similar choice to be cashed-out.  
 
An important exit mechanism is the shareholder appraisal right. It allows dissenting 
shareholders to proposed fundamental transactions and amendments to the 
Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) the right to have their shares acquired by the 
company in exchange for cash on a fair value that can be determined judicially. The 
appraisal remedy however serves further objectives relating to protection for minority 
shareholders than only as exit mechanism that will be discussed in respect to the 
chapter dealing with compulsory acquisitions in fundamental transactions.45 
 
 
2 5  Conclusion 
 
 
The original justification of the squeeze-out right was to remedy the mischief of the 
minority oppressing the majority in acquisition transactions. The notion being that a 
small minority shareholders group should not be entitled to obstruct or prevent a 
takeover transaction by not accepting an offer which has been accepted by an 
overwhelming number of the offerees. However in analysing the advantages of full 
                                                        
45 See Chapter 4 4 3 
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ownership and legal basis for shareholding raises the argument whether the squeeze-
out can be applied in a take over transaction but at any stage the controlling 
shareholder reaches the threshold shareholding.  
 
The argument is that the squeeze-out right should not be limited to control transfer 
types but also by virtue of the development minority protection devices to control 
maintained types. 
 
The test of such argument would be is it in the interest of the company as a whole to 
if such a mechanism is allowed. It is clear from the above analysis that full ownership 
or a company becoming a wholly owned subsidiary has benefits for the controller and 
is in line with a more efficient framework as unnecessary costs involved as a result of 
having minority shareholders and other benefits has stated above. 
 
In examining the squeeze out provision in the South African corporate framework 
further in this dissertation it will be noted that there may be value in applying the 
above argument to have a further mechanism. This is as a result with issues related to 
the interplay of certain provisions of the Act. 
 
The caveat of the squeeze out provision is ensuring the fair treatment of the affected 
minority shareholders. This is more complex than simply providing consideration 
equal to the market price of their holding. In allowing the squeeze out provision there 
must be regulation that ensures the fair treatment of the affected minority 
shareholders. 
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3 TENDER OFFER SQUEEZE-OUT 
 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
 
A tender offer type squeeze-out is a legislative mechanism that forms part of a two-
step transaction. First, in the tender offer stage, the offeror makes a public offer to 
attract shareholders in a target company. Second having successfully obtained the 
minimum level of shares required by the squeeze-out regulation, („the threshold‟), the 
offeror is allowed to acquire the shares held by the remaining minority shareholders 
in the compulsory acquisition stage. After the successful tender offer and subsequent 
acquisition of the remaining shares, the offeror will have obtained 100 per cent 
ownership of the target company.46 
 
The objective of the mechanism is for the acquirer who has provided considerable 
amounts of capital to be able to obtain the benefits of full ownership and not be 
oppressed by dissident or apathetic minority shareholders.47  
 
This type of transaction allows not only controlling shareholders but also outside 
acquirers of a target company. The main requirement is not the shareholding of the 
controlling shareholder but the number approvals provided for a tender offer. The 
mechanism is thus geared towards a control-transferred type of squeeze-out whereby 
it provides outside acquirers a means to obtain full ownership without the fear of a 
                                                        
46 Rho op cit (n4) at 55 
47 See Blackman op cit (n24) at 15A-143 and Vlok supra (n8) at para 74: „The legislature is concerned 
that the offeror, who may expend considerable sums of money in the expectation of acquiring total 
ownership of the shares in the target company, should not be prevented by a small minority of 
shareholders from acquiring total ownership of the shares and, if a corporate offeror, from converting 
the company into a wholly-owned subsidiary, and so obtaining the commensurate and legitimate 
benefits financial, administrative and commercial that go with such ownership. In England, 
experience, prior to the introduction in 1928 of the legislation to facilitate by the coercion of 
dissenting shareholders the amalgamation of companies, suggested that the holders of small numbers 
of the shares might, out of desire to exact better terms than the vast majority of their fellow 
shareholders were content to accept, hamper the arrangement or prevent it from materializing. Thus 
the object of the legislation was in effect to prevent an oppression of the majority by a minority.’ 
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small number of dissident or apathetic minority shareholders preventing a full 
ownership acquisition. 
 
In this chapter we will examine the tender offer squeeze-out provision provided in the 
Act. We will also examine how it is regulated in terms of case law principles where 
minority shareholders have challenged the transaction and in terms of takeover 
regulations. 
 
3 2  Squeeze-Out Mechanism in terms of the Act 
 
 
The provision provided in the Act48 is the statutory squeeze-out device, which is the 
second part of the two-part transaction in order to obtain full control of a target 
company by an acquirer. It contains numerous procedural elements however the 
objective is to enable an offeror whose offer has been accepted by the holders of 90 
per cent of the securities involved (ie other than those already held at the date of the 
issue of the of the offer by, or by a nominee for, the offeror or a related or inter-
related party or somebody acting in concert) to acquire any or all of those securities 
whose holders have not accepted the offer on the terms applicable to those who have 
and to compel the acquisition by the offeror his securities. The nuances and 
procedural elements of the said provision will be discussed further hereunder. 
 
The compulsory acquisition and squeeze-out provision of the Act states the 
following: 
 
(1) If, within four months after the date of an offer for the acquisition of any class 
of securities of a regulated company, that offer has been accepted by the 
holders of at least 90 percent of that class of securities, other than any such 
securities held before the offer by the offeror, a related or inter-related 
person, or persons acting in concert, or a nominee or subsidiary of any such 
person or persons-  
 
(a) within two further months, the offeror may notify the holders of the 
remaining securities of the class, in the prescribed manner and form-  
                                                        
48 s124 of the Act 
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(i)  that the offer has been accepted to that extent; and  
(ii)  that the offeror desires to acquire all remaining securities of that 
class; and  
(b)  subject to subsection (2), after giving notice in terms of paragraph (a), 
the offeror is entitled, and bound, to acquire the securities concerned on 
the same terms that applied to securities whose holders accepted the 
original offer. 
 
 
The first aspect to note is that the statutory squeeze-out relates to a tender offer and 
the threshold is in terms of acceptances of the offer and not previously owned shares 
or further conditions as stipulated in the provision. This includes shareholding held 
by related, inter related or persons acting in concert with the acquirer. 49  The 
requirement is thus that the acquirer must receive approvals from shareholders 
holding 90 per cent of the shares to which the offer has been made. This is difficult to 
achieve, as one can see from an illustration. In case the acquirer, such as a controller, 
holds 70 per cent shares in the company and wishes to squeeze-out the remaining 
shareholders, it must first make an offer to the minorities holding 30 per cent of the 
shares, in order for the acquirer to be eligible to effectuate a squeeze out, the offer 
must be accepted by shareholders holding at least 27 per cent shares in the company 
(i.e. 90 per cent of 30 per cent shares).50  
 
The second facet of the provision is that it is limited to regulated companies. A 
regulated company in terms of the Act is public companies, state-owned company or 
a private company that has expressly provided that it is regulated company in its MOI 
or if a private company has in any 24-month period, of more than 10 per cent of the 
value of their issued shares. This figure of more than 10 per cent can be over a 
number of transactions during a 24-month period.51 The objective of the distinction 
between regulated companies and other private companies is recognition that in the 
                                                        
49 The objective of this seems as a minority protection and prevents loopholes for the acquirer in 
applying the mechanism by acting in concert. 
50 Khanna op cit (n4) at 13 
51 s118(1)(c) read with reg 91 
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initial start-up phase of a private company the burden of compliance with applicable 
provisions in the Act and Regulations, in many instances be unduly harsh on a private 
company.52 
 
A further noticeable feature of the provision is that it defines the tender offer as „an 
offer for any class of securities‟ and if accepted by the threshold of that class of 
securities the requirement has been met. This seems to be an illogical since the 
objective of the squeeze out mechanism is to obtain full control of the target 
company. The provision however provides for a squeeze out of not the whole 
company but also for classes of securities. The justification of the squeeze-out 
mechanism does not seem to include for example the complete acquisition of the 
class of preference shares with a preference right at liquidation. The point being that 
some classes of shares that may be minimal or insignificant in terms of the total 
holding or influence in the target company.  
 
The acquisition of a class of securities which is minimal does not seems able to 
extract the benefits of full ownership such as to eliminating the cost of minority 
shareholding or delisting. There may be an instance of application of the free rider 
problem in respect to an offer for the acquisition of a class of securities however is it 
justifiable without the benefits of full ownership. 
 
In order to address this issue it must therefore be defined what is full ownership in the 
squeeze out justification basis. One of the possible definitions of full ownership in 
this context is when the target company becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
acquiring company, (in the case if the acquirer is a company). The definition of a 
wholly owned subsidiary another company is held or controlled the entire general 
voting rights with the issued securities of the target company.53 The argument can 
thus be made that the tender offer squeeze-out mechanism should only be available 
when the threshold is 90 per cent of the general voting rights in the target company. 
 
The rationale for the providing the squeeze-out mechanism in respect of each class of 
securities is possibly recognition that different classes of securities may have 
                                                        
52 Takeovers Regulations Panel Guideline note 3/2011 
53 s3(1)(b) of the Act 
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different values. The mechanism provides that those minorities being squeezed-out 
must be on the same terms as the original offer. Thus providing for each class of 
securities creates uniformity and prevents the abuse that those holders of a more 
valuable class of securities being required to accept an offer which is based on a less 
valuable or average valuation of all the classes of securities.  
 
The issue of offers relating to different classes of securities is referred at the 
provisions dealing with comparable offers. In the said provision it provides that 
should an offeror make an offer in regulated company containing more than one class 
of securities and the result is if accepted the offeror has more than the prescribed 
percentage of general voting rights he must make a comparable offer to each class of 
securities.54 The point being if this provision can deal with the different classes of 
securities why should the squeeze-out mechanism be allowed to differentiate between 
classes of securities and not concern itself with the general voting rights of the offer. 
 
In considering this issue a comparative perspective on jurisdictions that also provide 
for the tender offer squeeze out will provide some insight. The best possible 
comparison would probably be the guidance provided by the European Union 
Takeover Directive55, which provide guidelines for member states in order to have a 
certain level of uniformity in respect to takeover regulations. 56   On the issue of 
application of the squeeze-out mechanism on a target company that provides for more 
than one class of shares the directive states the following: 
 
‘Where the offeree company has issued more than one class of securities, 
Member States may provide that the right of squeeze-out can be exercised only in 
the class in which the threshold laid down in paragraph 2 has been reached.’57  
 
The above guiding principle has been incorporated in the UK tender offer squeeze-
out mechanism.58 The provision however does contain an additional requirement that 
                                                        
54 s125(2) of the Act 
55 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (the 'Directive) 
56 See the preamble of Directive  
57 See Article 15 at para 3 of the Directive  
58  See s979(1) read with s974 of Companies Act 2006 also G Morse „Palmer‟s Company Law: 
Annotated Guide to the Companies Act 2006‟ (2007) Sweet & Maxwell Limited at 719  
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the acceptances must in the case where the class of shares has voting rights, the 
threshold of the voting rights of that class of shares.59 
 
The position regarding the tender-offer squeeze-out is however different in the New 
Zealand jurisdiction. The squeeze-out device is more independent from the tender 
offer. If the tender offer results in an offeror becoming a dominant owner then the 
offeror can acquire the remaining minority shareholders holdings on same terms as 
the original offer.60 A dominant owner is a person or two or more persons acing in 
concert who become holders of 90 per cent of the voting rights in a company.61 The 
requirement in terms of acceptances of the offer is that 50 per cent or more of the 
equity shares in respect of the offer must have been accepted. This does not include 
securities held by the controller before the offer. Also the squeeze-out consideration 
in any class must be the same as consideration provided in the offer for equity 
securities in that class.62 
 
The threshold set in the provision is 90 per cent acceptances of the securities in a 
class. This threshold is in line with jurisdictions that provide for the tender offer 
squeeze-out mechanism. The European Union Takeover Directive provides that 
member states should have a threshold level between 90 per cent and 95 per cent in 
order to utilize a tender offer squeeze-out.63 
 
The procedural elements of the provision are that the offeror must reach the threshold 
of acceptances within four months of date of which the offer was made. The offeror 
has after the threshold been established two months whereby to provide notices 
informing the remaining security holders of his intention to acquire their holdings. He 
must also notify the remaining holders of the level of acceptances of his offer.64 This 
is important in respect to the sell out right of the remaining shareholders. 65  The 
                                                        
59 See s979(2)(b) of Companies Act 2006 
60 See Rule 56 of the New Zealand Takeovers Code („the Code‟) 
61 See Rule 50 of the Code 
62 See Rule 56(1);(3) of the Code 
63 See Article 15 at para 2 of the Directive 
64 s124(4)(a) of the Act 
65 s124(4) of the Act 
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remaining shareholders can then enforce their sell out rights within three months of 
receiving the notice regarding the acceptances on the same terms as the original offer. 
 
 
3 3  The regulation of the tender offer squeeze-outs  
 
 
As stated above the primary role of regulation is to ensure that the affected minority 
shareholders are treated fairly. In tender offer squeeze-outs this is mainly done 
through creating procedural requirements that the acquirer must comply with before 
she can squeeze-out the minority. One of the purposes of the procedural requirements 
is to provide the affected minority an opportunity to challenge the contemplated 
squeeze-out transaction.  
 
In the Act provision is made for recourse by the minority to challenge the 
contemplated transaction in order to obtain relief by either not entitling the offeror 
compulsory acquisition under the provision or imposing terms different to the 
original offer. 66  The primary criterion of the abovementioned discretion is the 
fairness of the affected transaction on the shareholders involved.67 This means that 
the court has to determine whether the terms of the offer made and accepted by 
majority is fair on all the shareholders affected. This test is subject to established 
principles, which has been developed in common law in respect to this remedy. The 
onus of proving the alleged unfairness is on those who allege it, in respect to this 
remedy it will be on the applicant dissident minority shareholders.68  
 
In challenging this form of transaction courts have presumption of fairness due to the 
offer being accepted by the overwhelming majority of the offerees. The design of the 
device is such that only taking into account acceptances and not taking into account 
the offeror‟s holdings can only abuse it in special circumstances. There is thus a built 
in approval mechanism of the supermajority of the minority shareholders. In this 
section the cases where the tender offer squeeze-out has been challenged will be 
                                                        
66 s124(2) of the Act 
67 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining supra (n8) 630; Mia v Anglo Alpha Cement supra (n8) at 
283, Delport cit op (n8) at 436 
68 Mia v Anglo Alpha Cement supra (n8) at 283 
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examined. The main principles derived from these cases will be identified and 
discussed. 
 
 
3 3 1 Fairness on the general body of shareholders 
 
 
The largest body of case law concerning objections to tender offer squeeze-outs are 
from the UK and many jurisdictions, including South Africa have relied on principles 
that are derived from these cases. One of the most relevant case in respect of the 
nature of this remedy is from the matter of In Re Grierson, Oldham and Adams Ltd.69 
In that matter the dissident minority shareholders after receiving a statutory notice to 
acquire their shares70 applied to court tender offer in respect of the notice was unfair 
on the following grounds: 
 
i. The price offered for the shares was lower than the market price of the shares 
relating to previous years; 
 
ii. The assets and the prospects of the company warranted a higher price; 
 
iii. The price offered did not recognise the advantages to be obtained by the 
offeror in respect of the acquisition; 
 
iv. The offer price was slightly above market price but it is as result of a 
depressed market resulting from external factors and its common that take 
over price offer exceeds market price considerably; 
 
v. The offer price compared unfavourably compared to price offers of other 
classes of shares; 
 
vi. The applicants would be compelled to sell shares at loss from original 
investment and would not be capable to deduct from capital gains tax. 
 
                                                        
69 [1968] 1 Ch 17 32; [1967] 1 All ER 192 197 
70 s209 companies act 1948 
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The evidence presented by the applicants was done by an independent expert and was 
unchallenged, as the respondent company presented no evidence to contrary. The 
court thus accepted the evidence on all the abovementioned grounds. It would seem 
at this stage on the evidence that the offer price given is unfair to the dissident 
minority. 
 
The chancery division however upheld the principle that the test of fairness is not on 
the applicant minority but upon all the affected shareholders including those who did 
not oppose and accepted the offer. The court to this effect stated the following: 
 
‘When considering whether a scheme is fair or not what the court must consider 
is whether it is fair or unfair on the general body of shareholders, and not 
whether it is fair or unfair to the individual shareholders. The offer price was not 
inadequate and its fairness is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that over 99 
per cent of the shareholders have accepted it.’71  
 
The court further confirmed that for this remedy to succeed the court must find that 
the offer or scheme to be „obviously unfair, patently unfair, unfair to the meanest 
intelligence‟72 and it is not sufficient to show that the offer was not as generous as it 
might have been. 
 
The principle is thus that the test of fairness is applied on all the body of shareholders 
not just those shareholders who are the applicants or were subject to the squeeze-out. 
 
3 3 2 Special circumstances 
 
It is clear form the above principle that the onus of proving the unfairness of the 
tender is exceptionally difficult taking into account the large number of shareholders 
who accepted the offer. The common law have however recognised in some instances 
that there are special circumstances in which presumption of fairness less likely. I 
such instances the fairness test can also be on the dissident shareholders and not just 
the general body of shareholders affected by the transaction. 
                                                        
71 at 26 G 
72 In re Sussex Brick Co Ltd [1961] Ch 289n 
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The principle or exception of special circumstances was first noted in the matter of In 
Re Hoare and Co. Ltd.73 where Maugham J said the following: 
 
'prima facie the Court ought to regard the scheme as a fair one inasmuch as it 
seems to me impossible to suppose that the Court, in the absence of very strong 
grounds, is to be entitled to set up its own view of the fairness of the scheme in 
opposition to so very large a majority of the shareholders who are concerned. 
Accordingly, without expressing a final opinion on the matter, because there may 
be special circumstances in special cases, I am unable to see that I have any 
right to order otherwise in such a case as I have before me, unless it is 
affirmatively established that, notwithstanding the view of a very large majority 
of shareholders, the scheme is unfair. There may be other grounds, but I see no 
other grounds available in the present case for the interference of the Court' 
 
 
One clear example of the so called special circumstances was recognised was in the 
matter of In re Bugle Press Ltd.74 the facts of the matter were as follows: 
 
The transferor company, Bugle Press Ltd, had three shareholders, with the two main 
shareholders holding 4500 shares each. The sole minority shareholder held 1000 
shares. The two main shareholders, holding 9000 shares, incorporated the transferee 
company of which they were the sole directors and shareholders and was 
incorporated for the sole purpose to effect the acquisition of the transferor company. 
The new company acquired the shareholding of the two main shareholders and 
proceeded to squeeze-out the minority shareholder by virtue of having nine tenths of 
the total shares in the company. 
 
In that matter the court found that there is sufficient grounds to refuse the acquirer to 
squeeze-out the affected remaining minority shareholders. It is clear in this situation 
the two main shareholders can easily collude and the offer consideration can be 
manipulated in order to utilise the squeeze-out on terms that are unfair to the minority 
shareholder. 
                                                        
73 [1934] 150 L.T. 375 (also reported at 1933 All E.R. 105) as confirmed in the Mia judgment 
74 [1961] 1 Ch. 67 CA 
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3 3 3  Non-compliance with procedural requirements 
 
It is self evident that the best possible manner to challenge the fairness of a 
transaction is by alleging non-compliance with the procedural requirements of the 
provision. As stated the procedural grounds serve the purpose of informing the 
minority shareholders and offering them an opportunity to challenge the validity of 
the purported squeeze-out. In Rathie v. Montreal Trust Co.75 the Supreme Court of 
Canada found in favour of dissidient minority shareholders based on non-complaince 
with the statutory time period of the notice to the shareholders.76 
 
3 4  Conclusion 
 
The tender offer squeeze-out device deals directly with the mischief of oppression by 
the minority on the majority in takeovers as identified by the Greene Committee.77 
The device is also very efficient as it does not require extensive minority protection 
methods in order to ensure fair treatment of the affected shareholders. This is as a 
result of the original offer being presumed fair if accepted by the supermajority of the 
offerees.  
 
The issue however in respect to the application of the device is that would it give 
effect to the objectives of compulsory acquisitions if it can be applied to only a class 
of securities. This issue may need some consideration as it may be open to abuse or it 
may simply be utilised arbitrarily. There may need to be a restriction of some sorts 
that it cannot be utilised when it deals with an insignificant class of securities in the 
company. 
 
It should however be kept in mind that the device is contingent to a tender offer and 
is thus geared towards controlled-transfer form of squeeze-out. It does not deal with 
the possible oppression by the minority in respect to supermajority controlling 
                                                        
75 (1953) 2 S.C.R. 204 
76 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining supra (n8) at 633 
77 See chapter 2 2 2  
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shareholders who to the benefit of the company as whole should be allowed to 
squeeze-out a small percentage minority shareholders. 
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4 FUNDAMENTAL TRANSACTIONS SQUEEZE-OUTS: SCHEME OF 
ARRANGEMENT AND STATUTORY MERGER  
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
 
The definition of a fundamental transaction is not provided in the Act however it can 
be commonly defined as transactions that fundamentally alter the company. The Act 
provides for three types of fundamental transactions being a disposal of all or greater 
part of the assets or the undertaking of a company, an amalgamation or merger and a 
scheme of arrangement.78  
 
The compulsory acquisition of minority shareholding can be utilised in terms of these 
transactions by means of a statutory merger or scheme of arrangement. In these 
transactions the terms of the transaction may be to provide some form of 
consideration for minority shareholders other than equity in the newly formed entity 
or resulting entity. Thereby the minority shareholders can be squeezed-out of the 
company because the said transactions can be effected by a special resolution79 (in 
terms of authority) and as such there may a situation where the affected minority 
shareholder may vote against the resolution but still be bound by the terms of the 
resolution.  
 
In the disposal of the all or greater portion of the assets transaction, the company may 
be fundamentally altered however it does not provide a manner whereby minority 
shareholders are offered consideration for the compulsory acquisition of their holding 
and effectively squeezed-out of the company.  
 
The sell out right in fundamental transactions is the dissenting shareholder appraisal 
rights mechanism. 80  Effectively minority shareholders who vote against a 
fundamental transaction resolution may force a company, subject to the requirements 
of the applicable provision, to acquire their shares for a fair value to be determined 
judicially.  
                                                        
78 See s112-114 of the Act 
79 See s 115(2) of the Act 
80 See s164 of the Act 
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In this chapter we will illustrate how the scheme of arrangement and the statutory 
merger can be utilised as a squeeze-out device. We will also show the safeguards for 
affected minority shareholders and the right of recourse. In respect of the appraisal 
right it will be shown that it is not merely an exit mechanism but also serves other 
objectives in respect of the protection of minority shareholders.  
 
4 2  Scheme of Arrangement 
 
A scheme of arrangement is an agreement or arrangement between a company and 
holders of any class of securities in that company. The arrangement is proposed by 
the board of the company and is then subject to the requirements set out in applicable 
provisions. The Act sets out the various forms that the arrangement may be in terms 
of following: 
 
a) a consolidation of securities of different classes 
b) a division of securities into different classes 
c) an expropriation of securities from holders 
d) exchanging any of its securities for other securities 
e) a reacquisition by the company of its securities 
f) a combination of the above methods81 
 
As set out above the Act makes specific provision for the squeeze-out right in that the 
arrangement may take the form of an expropriation for securities from holders. If all 
the requirements as set out in the Act for a scheme of arrangement82 are met then the 
arrangement becomes binding on all the shareholders or the relevant class of 
shareholders and on the company by virtue of the special resolution. 
 
The scheme of arrangement has been an attractive for acquirers who wanted to obtain 
full control of a target company in terms of the previous company act in South 
Africa. 83  The reason being that there was no quorum requirement to effect the 
transaction however different to the new dispensation the scheme of arrangement was 
required to have court approval. The essential requirements for the special resolution 
                                                        
81 See s 114(1) of the Act 
82 Will be discussed hereunder 
83 See s311 of the 1973 Act 
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could be achieved with greater ease than by trying to achieve the tender offer squeeze 
out threshold of 90 per cent acceptances.84 Cassim provides an illustration of this 
form of transaction being the following: 
 
‘Offeror A could propose a scheme of arrangement between company B and its 
members in terms of which the members were paid a scheme consideration of 
R10 per share. Assume that the court application for the leave to convene a 
scheme meeting was granted and that the scheme of arrangement was approved 
at the scheme meeting by 75 per cent of the scheme members present and voting 
(Note that the approval of, for example, 75 per cent of 50 per cent of the 
company would be sufficient if only per cent of the shareholders attended the 
meeting or were represented there. This amounts to approval by 37.5 per cent of 
the company). If the court then sanctioned the results of the scheme meeting and 
the order was duly registered, the rest of the shareholders (in this example 62.5 
per cent-being those who either attended the meeting and abstained or voted 
against the scheme, as well as those who did not attend) would be bound by the 
scheme in terms of the 1973 Act. Thus they would be forced to part with their 
shares at R10 per share – in essence an expropriation of their property 
authorised by 37.5 per cent of the shareholders of the company. In this way the 
offeror could acquire 100 per cent of the shareholding in the company.’85 
 
The use of the scheme of arraignment as a take-over mechanism and specifically as 
mechanism that allow a form of expropriation has been debated in South African case 
law.86 In the matter of Ex Parte Mielie-Kip Ltd87 Fleming J dealt with the issue 
                                                        
84 See s440K of the 1973 Act 
85 Cassim op cit (n28) at 727 -728 
86 In Ex Parte Natal Coal Exploration 1985 (4) SA 279 (W), the court held that expropriation of rights 
of a shareholder (ie where a shareholder receives a sum of money as compensation) is, no matter how 
fair the assessment of the compensation, a concept which falls outside the legitimated sense of the term 
„arrangement‟ in the context of the statute. In Ex Parte Suiderland Development Corporation 1986 (2) 
SA 442 (C) it was held that expropriation in that context can be considered an arrangement. See also 
Cassim op cit (n28) at 728. 
87 1991 (3) SA 449 (W) at 453-454 
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whether the expropriation of shares can be considered a scheme of arrangement in 
terms of the 1973 Act and stated the following: 
 
‘I have difficulty with the rhetorical question in the minority judgment as to 
why an agreement for the sale ('expropriation') of shares should not be an 
arrangement. The expected answer remains without reasons. The positive 
question as to why it should be an arrangement is the appropriate question. 
There is no reason why an offer from A to obtain the shares of B against 
remuneration (which would result in a sale but with 'expropriation' coming in 
from the point of view that it may become binding even if B refuses the offer, 
other shareholders being in a position by the requisite majority to veto his 
refusal) would be an arrangement 'between' the company and the seller. It in no 
way affects the existence, scope or content of the relationship between the 
company and the member. What flows from being the registered holder of a 
specific share is unchanged. In that respect, already, the arrangement is not with 
the company or between the company and its member. A sale, compulsory sale, 
expropriation, and the like furthermore only changes the riders and not the 
qualities of the reins which link the rider with the horse. The company is relative 
to the nature of the transaction an unnecessary party if the reins are merely 
handed over. Unnecessary 'joining' in the transaction in terms of the words used 
or the form of the contract should not influence the substance: a purchase of 
shares with complete consent or with majority consent is not an arrangement 
between the company and its members, but between offeror and offerees. It must 
be remembered that it is not the word 'arrangement' which should be interpreted. 
A complete phrase is under consideration.’ 
 
This issue seems to been resolved by the legislature by specifically including the 
words „an expropriation of securities from the holder.‟88 The scheme of arrangement 
is then without doubt a mechanism in order to squeeze-out minority shareholders. 
                                                        
88 See SM Luiz „Some Comments on the Scheme of Arrangement as an “Affected Transaction” as 
defined in the Companies Act 71 of 2008, PER/PERJ2012 Vol 15 No 5 at 106/638:   
‘The purpose of listing the possible elements that may be included as part of a scheme of arrangement 
is to put to rest most of the debates that have occurred in the context of the interpretation of section 
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The requirements to effect a scheme of arrangement is the same for fundamental 
transaction that will be discussed together. There are certain exceptions that will be 
highlighted. 
 
 
4 3  Statutory Merger 
 
 
As stated above the Act has introduced a new concept to the South African corporate 
legal framework being the statutory merger. The broad definition of a statutory 
merger is the assets and liabilities of two or more companies are pooled in a single 
company that may either be a new company or a surviving company of the 
transaction.89 This form of transaction can be utilised as a squeeze-out mechanism 
whereby the minority shareholders receives a cash or other consideration, but not 
equity in the merged entity, in exchange for their shares in either one of the previous 
entities. The ability to use the statutory merger to squeeze-out device would thus 
depend on the possible limitation on the consideration paid in respect of a merger. 
 
It seems the Act has taken a liberal approach in this regard by not limiting the manner 
in which consideration (other than equity in the merged entity) is given in a merger 
transaction.90 The principal idea of paying cash consideration to the shareholders of 
                                                                                                                                                              
311 (the scheme of arrangement provision) under the Companies Act 1973. Those centered on issues 
such as whether shareholders could have their shares expropriated in exchange for cash or whether 
an arrangement meant that the shareholders' interests could be altered but not altogether 
extinguished.’  
89 Cassim op cit (n28) at 676 
90 See s113(2) of the Act whereby the legislature sets out the possible terms of the merger agreement 
and specifically at s113(2)(b) makes provision for consideration in lieu of securities in the merged 
company but no limitation on what that consideration can be. See also Ezra Davids, Trevor Norwitz 
and David Yullis „A microscopic analysis of the new merger and amalgamation provision in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008‟ (2010) Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South 
African Economy at 345 : ‘There also is nothing in the section, which prevents or limits the payment of 
a cash consideration. The ability to pay cash consideration in the context of a merger is not without 
controversy, particularly given the possibility that it may be used as a mechanism to expropriate or 
‘freeze out’ minority shareholders, and indeed certain jurisdictions place a limitation on the 
proportion of the consideration which may be in cash. Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions, 
including the United States and Canada, allow for the payment of cash consideration. It would also be 
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the disappearing company is that shareholders do not have a vested right to continue 
to hold their investment as shareholders of the surviving merged entity but could 
instead be cashed out.91 It can thus be used to eliminate minority shareholders, which 
is also known as a freeze out merger. 
 
A further distinction relating to mergers is an arm‟s length merger and an interested 
merger. In a arm‟s length merger the acquiring party does not have equity interest in 
the target company whereas in a interested merger the acquiring party does have a 
equity interest in the target company and is usually the majority or controlling 
shareholder. It can thus be said that an arm‟s length freeze out merger is a controlled-
transferred squeeze-out transaction whereas the interested party. 
 
 
4 4 The Regulation of Squeeze-Outs in Fundamental Transactions 
 
 
In this section the regulation of scheme of arrangements and statutory mergers in the 
context, as squeeze out mechanism will be analysed. The most important aspect will 
be whether there is sufficient protection and fair treatment of the affected minority 
shareholders. As mentioned above the Act provides for a dissident shareholder 
appraisal mechanism, this will be viewed as a sell-out right however it also provides 
further aspects in respect to minority protection that will be discussed. The emphasis 
here will be to analyse the prerequisites of the applicable fundamental transactions as 
suitable safeguards for the said minority as well as the right to recourse by a minority 
on alleged unfair squeeze-out transactions. A comparative analysis will be done of 
the identifies safeguards against those which have been used in applicable jurisdiction 
being the United States regulation of the long form merger and in particular in the 
State of Delaware, in order to assess whether the statutory safeguards to freeze-out 
mergers are adequate. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
possible for a buyer to offer a mix of cash and share consideration, which might be a fixed blend of x 
shares and y rand per target company share or could be structured to allow target shareholders to 
choose cash or shares (with a mechanism to prorate the oversubscribed form of consideration).’ 
91 Cassim op cit (n28) at 709 
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4 4 1  Statutory Prerequisites  
 
 
Both forms of applicable fundamental transactions being the scheme of arrangements 
and statutory merger have similar statutory prerequisites. There however two notable 
exceptions to this statement.  
 
In a statutory merger the boards of each merging companies is required to perform a 
solvency and liquidity test as prescribed in the Act.92 The boards must be satisfied 
that upon implementation of the merger agreement both or all the entities will be pass 
the solvency and liquidity test as prescribed in the Act. This is not a prerequisite for 
implementing a scheme of arrangement, however if the scheme involves the 
repurchase of shares by the company.93 The purpose of the solvency and liquidity is 
for the protection of amongst others the creditors and shareholders of the company 
and will thus not be applicable as a protection measure for the shareholders who will 
be squeezed-out. 
 
In a scheme of arrangement the company is required to retain an independent expert 
who must compile a report which must amongst other identify the holders of 
securities who are affected by the proposed scheme and evaluate the material adverse 
effects against the compensation received by those persons in terms of the scheme.94 
This can thus be viewed as a safeguard provided to affected shareholders in the case 
of expropriation of shares. The use of an independent expert and report is also 
applicable to statutory mergers in certain instances. If in statutory merger one of the 
merging companies is a regulated company there must be request for a ruling made to 
the Takeovers Panel whether or not an independent expert must be retained for the 
proposed merger.95 The said independent expert must compile a report which should 
also include the requirements for the said report for a scheme of arrangement, as well 
other requirements as set out in the applicable regulation mainly relating to valuation 
                                                        
92 See s113(4) read with s4 of the Act 
93 See Luiz op cit (n88) at 113/638 to 116/638 
94 See s114(2) & (3) in particular s114(3)(b)-(d) of the Act 
95 See reg90 read with s117(1)(c)(ii) of the Act 
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of the transaction.96 The report must also contain an opinion on the fairness and 
reasonableness of the offer considerations on the affected holders of securities.97 
 
There is a further regulatory burden on transactions involving regulated companies as 
mentioned above. The companies that are not regulated companies are private 
companies that have not transferred 10 per cent of its issued securities, other than to 
related or inter-related, within 24-month period. The objective of this provision is 
recognition that in the initial start-up phase of a private company the burden of 
compliance with applicable provisions in the Act and Regulations, in many instances 
be unduly harsh on a private company.98  
 
A significant aspect of, the solvency and liquidity as well as the independent expert 
provisions are that they contain mandatory disclosures to all holders of securities.99 
These disclosures must include shareholders appraisal rights and requirements of a 
fundamental transaction as set out in s115 that will be discussed hereunder. 
 
The common statutory prerequisites for fundamental transactions are provided for in 
s115 of the Act. The most important aspect of this provision is the authority for the 
approval of a fundamental transaction in terms of a special resolution. The special 
resolution required is however different to the normal special resolution provided in 
the Act, as it must comply with certain further requirements.100 If the transaction is 
not approved in the manner provided in the provision it may not be implemented at 
all. 
 
The special resolution requires a meeting, which the quorum is constituted by at least 
25 per cent of all the voting rights are entitled to be exercised on that matter.101 
Notably the MOI may not decrease the quorum requirements but can increase the 
requirements. The special resolution requires the support of at least 75 per cent of the 
                                                        
96 See reg90(2) 
97 See reg90(6)(c) 
98 See para 2.3 of Guideline 3/2011 of the Takeover Regulations Panel 
99 See s 113(5) and 114(3) of the Act 
100 See s115(1) of the Act 
101 See s115(2)(a) of the Act 
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voting rights actually exercised on the resolution. It can further be deduced from the 
wording of the relevant provision that the MOI cannot contain a decrease or increase 
in the required voting approval for the said special resolution.102 The 75 per cent 
threshold is apparently fixed and cannot be altered. 
 
The most important development in respect to protection afforded for affected 
minority shareholders is that any voting rights controlled by the acquiring party, or 
person related to an acquiring party, or persons acting in concert with the acquiring 
party is disqualified for purposes of the voting and calculating the quorum in respect 
to the said special resolution.103  This is an important protection for the affected 
minority shareholders and is also known as the „majority-of-the-minority-vote.‟ The 
purpose of this exclusion is most likely to prevent a situation as illustrated in using 
the scheme of arrangement as a squeeze out mechanism 104  whereby there is a 
possibility unfair expropriation of minority shareholders. As will be discussed further 
the „majority-of-the-minority-vote‟ is used as a protection tool in freeze out mergers 
in the US jurisdiction.  
 
One of the main features of the new Act is that court approval for fundamental 
transactions is not mandatory. This feature is based on the premise that where the 
proposed fundamental transaction has been approved by the requisite votes, the 
dissenters are not allowed to approach the courts in order prevent or frustrate the 
transaction. This is main shift from the 1973 provisions that required a two court 
approvals to implement a scheme of arrangement. 105  The new provision does 
however provide court approval where the special resolution was opposed by at least 
15 per cent of the voting rights and on application of a shareholder who voted against 
the resolution.106 Court approval may also be required if a shareholder who voted 
against the resolution and was granted leave by the court.107 
                                                        
102 See s115(1) of the Act and Cassim op cit (n28) at 690 
103 See s115(4) of the Act 
104 See at 4 2 the Cassim op cit (n28) illustration of using the Scheme of Arrangement mechanism to 
gain 100 per cent control in terms of the 1973 Act. 
105 See s311 of the 1973 Act 
106 See s115(3)(a) 
107 See s115(3)(b) read with s115(6)&(7) 
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There is no automatic right to recourse provided to a disgruntled shareholder and can 
only require the resolution to be reviewed by the court if firstly the shareholder was 
granted leave by the court. The provision is also silent on whether the court in 
reviewing the resolution may grant an order amending the terms of the resolution as 
provided in the right of recourse in a tender offer squeeze-out.108 The grounds on 
which a court can set aside a resolution is also narrow being if it is manifestly unfair 
to any class of shareholders, tainted by conflict of interests, inadequate disclosures, 
failure to comply with the Act, MOI, rule or material significant procedural 
irregularity.109 
 
It is clear form this provision that it is the intention of the legislature to only allow 
court intervention where it is absolutely necessary. This liberalisation may be 
welcomed but has raised concerns amongst commentators taking into account the 
possibility of squeezing-out or freezing-out minority shareholders by implementing 
fundamental transactions. 110  Taking into account the limited recourse or court 
involvement further minority protections in this form of squeeze-outs should be 
investigated. In order to determine the said protection I will look at similar 
jurisdictions in respect to the applicable provisions of the Act. 
 
 
4 4 2  Freeze-Out Long Form Merger Regulation in the Delaware Jurisdiction 
 
 
The purpose in doing a comparative analysis on the Delaware jurisdiction is that it 
also provides for freeze-out mergers without prior court approval. The said 
jurisdiction provides for long form mergers111 and so called short form tender offer 
                                                        
108 See s124(2)(b) 
109 See s115(7) of the Act 
110 See Cassim op cit (n28) at 714: ‘Needless to say, the majority-of-the-minority-vote is a necessary 
but not a sufficient protection for the minority shareholders in a freeze-out merger. Further effective 
minority-protection measures are required. These will no doubt in due course form part of the 
fiduciary duties of directors as developed by the courts, and also form part of the new Takeover 
Regulations.’  
111 See S251 of the DGCL 
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mergers.112 In this analysis I will focus on the long form mergers as the short-form 
mergers fall under supermajority types squeeze outs that will be discussed in chapter 
five. The long form merger is similar to the South African statutory merger 
procedure. 
 
In Delaware a freeze-out merger is typically executed where the controlling 
shareholder establishes a wholly owned company, the target company‟s board 
(typically dominated by the controller) approves the merger and the shareholders 
target company (also dominated by the controller) approves the transaction. Under 
the terms of the merger, the minority shareholders receive either cash or the 
controller‟s shares in exchange for their shares in the target company. The transaction 
is executed as a statutory merger under section 251 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.113 In determining further minority shareholder protection in these 
transactions we will examine how courts of Delaware dealt with this issue. 
 
The main standard of review in United States corporate law is the business judgment 
rule. This standard is predicated on the principle that the business affairs a company 
are managed by or under the direction of the board of directors. 114 In terms of this 
right the business judgment rule requires courts to defer to business decision as long 
as those decisions comply with the board‟s fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care and 
good faith. The business judgment rule thus shields the directors from legal liability if 
they performed their duties diligently and carefully. The rule is thus both a procedural 
and substantive rule. In the context of procedural it places a burden of proof on the 
plaintiff to overcome the court‟s presumption that the directors have acted within 
their fiduciary duties. The substantive element limits the directors‟ liability to only 
decision not made within their fiduciary duties.115 
 
If however a plaintiff can rebut the presumption that the business judgment rule is not 
applicable then the standard of review of the board‟s decision is the „entire fairness‟ 
                                                        
112 See S253 of the DGCL 
113 Subramanian op cit (n18) at 9. 
114 See Mcullin v Beran 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) 
115 See F Balotti & J Hanks „ Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule 48 Bus Law 1337, 133-40 
(1993). 
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standard of review. Under the entire fairness review the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant directors to show that the challenged transaction both resulted from a fair 
dealing process and represents a fair price. The standard of review is thus of 
significance for shareholder litigation.116 
 
In shareholder litigation challenging freeze-out merger transactions Delaware courts 
established that such transactions would be subject to the entire fairness standard of 
review. This was due to the general approach to self-dealing transactions.117  
 
In dealing with this form shareholder litigation by applying the entire fairness review 
the courts stated various minority shareholder protection mechanisms that could have 
been utilised which would have resulted in fair dealing of the transaction. One such 
mechanism was the target company establishing a special committee of independent 
directors to assess and negotiate with the acquirer or controlling shareholder on 
behalf of the affected minority shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court, in the 
matter of Weinberger v UOP, first introduced this mechanism.118 
 
The Weinberg matter involved a freeze-out of UOP‟s minority shareholders by its 
50.5 per cent shareholder, Signal. The court in applying the entire fairness found 
several issues including conflict of interests in preparation of the valuation reports 
and casualness of the fairness opinion provided by the advisors to UOP‟s board. In 
dealing with these issues the court paused to note a possible mechanism to avoid 
these forms of unfair dealings whereby it stated: 
 
‘Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have 
been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating 
committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm’s length. Since 
fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly 
independent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is 
unfortunate that this course apparently was neither considered nor pursued. 
                                                        
116 Pinta op cit (n42) 935 at fn 10 also see generally D Block, E Barton & S Radin „ The Business 
Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors (1998) 5th Ed  
117 Subramanian op cit (n18) at 9 
118 457 A.2d 701 (Del 1983) 
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Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was 
as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining 
power against the other at arm’s length is strong evidence that the transaction 
meets the test of fairness.’119  
 
 
The use of the mechanism of a special committee of independent directors 
negotiating at an arm‟s length became standard practice in concluding freeze-out 
mergers.  
 
A further mechanism was identified in the matter of Rosenblatt v Getty Oil Co.120 
being the approval of the majority of the minority shareholders (‘ the MOM 
condition’). In that matter after extensive negotiations between the parties to a 
freeze-out merger proposal, the final proposal was presented to the shareholders. In 
the vote 89 per cent of the minority shareholders, representing 58 per cent of all the 
minority shares, approved the transaction. The deal was finalised and the minority 
shareholders fairness claim in the Delaware Chancery Court. The chancery court 
found the deal to be fair and it was subsequently appealed. The Delaware Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal however further found that the approval by the minority 
shareholders shifted the burden on entire fairness to the plaintiff but not change the 
standard of review to that of the business judgment rule.121 
 
The result of these judgments was that, in the event of a freeze-out merger, if either 
the MOM condition or special committee of independent directors was employed 
before the deal was finalised the burden of proof of the entire fairness review shifted 
on the plaintiff minority shareholder.  
 
In the recent judgement of In re MFW Shareholders Litigation122 the court made a 
major development in respect of the steps required during the conclusion of a freeze 
                                                        
119 Weinberg supra (n118) at 709 
120 493 A.2d 929 (Del.1985) 
121 Subramanian op cit (n18) at 16 
122 67A. 3d 496, 502 (Del. Ch 2013) 
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out merger. In that matter MacAndrews & Forbes a holding company whose equity is 
solely owned by defendant Ronald Perelman owned 43 per cent of M&F Worldwide 
(MFW). MacAndrews & Forbes offered to purchase the rest of the corporation‟s 
equity in a freeze-out merger for $24 per share. But upfront, MacAndrews & Forbes 
said it would not proceed with any going private transaction that was not approved:  
by an independent special committee and by a vote of a majority of the stockholders 
unaffiliated with the controlling stockholder.  
 
The court found that by employing the both the protection mechanisms of the special 
committee of independent directors and the MOM condition the standard of review 
changes from the entire fairness review to that of the business judgment rule standard 
of review. This was a landmark decision in that the court recognises that by 
employing both sets of protection methods the minority is sufficiently protected and 
that recourse should be limited to only when there was a breach of a fiduciary duty. 
The mechanisms are therefore only really effective when used in tandem and not as 
substitutes.123 
 
This is an important development in the protection of minority shareholders by 
placing a fiduciary duty on directors and allowing minority shareholders an 
opportunity to approve a transaction without being coerced. 
 
4 4 3 Dissident Shareholder Appraisal Right 
 
As stated earlier the dissident shareholder appraisal right is a means whereby the 
minority shareholder upon a certain triggering event can force the company to 
                                                        
123 See MFW Judgement supra (n122) at 8 where Chancellor Strine held:  
 A special committee alone ensures only that there is a bargaining agent who can negotiate price and 
address the collective action problem facing stockholders, but it does not provide stockholders any 
chance to protect themselves. A majority-of-the-minority vote provides stockholders a chance to vote 
on a merger proposed by a controller-dominated board, but with no chance to have an independent 
bargaining agent work on their behalf to negotiate the merger price, and determine whether it is a 
favorable one that the bargaining agent commends to the minority stockholders for acceptance at a 
vote. These protections are therefore incomplete and not substitutes, but are complementary and 
effective in tandem.  
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acquire its shares at a fair value. The triggering events is a proposed fundamental 
transaction or a proposed amendment of the MOI and the shareholder must vote 
against the proposal also further comply with other statutory requirements.124 
 
There are three main underlying objectives of the appraisal remedy. The first is an 
exit mechanism for the shareholder who as result of fundamental change in his 
investment (the triggering events) must comply with the majority of the shareholders 
by virtue of the special resolution. The mechanism thus provides that he be cashed 
out on fair value of his holdings and is thus not subject to the majority if it would 
fundamentally alter his or her investment. 
 
The second objective is to remedy for unfairness, where the minority shareholders 
believe that the price offered for their holdings do not at least represent a fair value of 
those shares. In this way the said shareholders are provided an alternative means to 
challenge the price offered. 
 
The third objective is that the appraisal rights serve as a deterrent for unfair decisions 
in respect to the fundamental transactions or amendments of the MOI. This entails 
that even if they can pass the resolution that can possibly unfair on some shareholders 
those shareholders can invoke their appraisal rights that the company would want to 
avoid and thus prevent from making unfair decisions in the first place.125  
 
In theory the appraisal rights would serve as a counter balance for compulsory 
acquisitions made by the controlling shareholder or outside acquirer, however there 
are certain flaws in this theory. Firstly the dissident shareholder that is subject to 
strict statutory requirements must initiate the appraisal right. The appraisal right 
should thus be seen as an additional form of regulation of squeeze-outs but should not 
be utilised as sole forms of regulation to protect affected minority shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
124 s164 of the Act 
125 Cassim op cit (n28) at 797 
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4 5 Conclusion 
 
 
The Act has introduced new innovations in the field of South African takeover, the 
objective of which is to balance the encouragement of economic activity and prudent 
risk-taking with appropriate protections for the interests of all company 
stakeholders. 126  In this section there is an attempt answer whether the minority 
shareholders are adequately protected in these transactions because the mandatory 
court approvals have been jettisoned in lieu for further statutory or regulatory 
minority protection mechanisms. The question has been raised in respect to the extent 
whereby the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders in the event 
of the discussed transactions.127 It is however argued that the duty owed should not be 
limited to information but that there should be a positive duty on directors to bargain 
on behalf of shareholders. This section will thus argue that the said duty is owed to 
the minority shareholders in the context of the best interests of the company by way 
of employing the arms-length approach to fundamental transactions. 
 
The minority protection to be employed in these transactions should be based on 
three principles all in the context of an arms length approach. The first being there 
should be sufficient disclosure made in respect to these transactions. The second 
being, that the there should be a fiduciary duty on the board towards the minority 
shareholders to enable them with bargaining power in respect to the transaction. The 
third aspect is that the minority must approve the transaction and not be coerced by 
the controlling shareholder. 
 
                                                        
126 Davids op cit (n90) at 334 
127 See Cassim op cit (n28) at 701: ‘The Act does not explicitly require any information to be 
furnished to the shareholders nor does it require the directors to give any advice or recommendations 
to the shareholders. However, the directors’ fiduciary duties may well require more of directors. It is 
submitted that the fiduciary duties of directors would for instance, require the directors to honestly 
and objectively consider whether the merger, including the terms and conditions of the merger 
consideration, is in the best interest of the company. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for 
directors to furnish shareholders with a report by an independent expert on the merits of the proposed 
merger. The new Takeover Regulations (insofar they are applicable to the company) also supplement 
the role of the board of directors.’ 
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In respect to disclosure the Act has provided sufficient safeguards by in respect of 
schemes of arrangements the employment of an independent expert required to 
provide a report and in terms of statutory mergers involving a regulated company. 
This ensures that the minority have ability to assess the findings of an independent 
expert and the report provided must comply with the statutory and regulatory 
requirements. 
 
The takeovers regulations do also require an independent board opinion of an offeree, 
regulated company (after taking into account the fair and reasonable opinion supplied 
by the independent expert). This opinion must then be communicated to the holders 
of securities in the offeree company that would be affected by the offer. 128  The 
difference between this procedure and the requirement of a special committee of 
independent directors in the Delaware Jurisdiction is the ability to bargain on behalf 
of the affected shareholders. The South African takeovers regulations provide for a 
board opinion that is disclosure provided to the affected shareholders. 
 
The second aspect is to provide the affected minority shareholders with some form of 
arm‟s length bargaining power. This can be achieved by the employment of the target 
company‟s board of directors to establish a special committee with the ability to veto 
a transaction if it is not on fair terms. In doing so the directors of a company will have 
to owe a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders in certain instances which have 
not been a feature of the South African corporate legal framework. In order to ensure 
that there is no conflict of interests and by keeping the process at an arm‟s length the 
board should establish a special committee of independent directors and the 
requirements of this independence should be contained in the takeover regulations. 
 
The Act sufficiently provides for the authority of the said transactions by a majority 
of the minority format in terms of the required special resolution. This is an adequate 
protection mechanism in terms of the principle of arm‟s length unforced approval.  
 
The Act also provides for an appraisal right to affected shareholders. It should 
however be remembered that it should be considered as a right to the minority 
shareholder and not as regulation of the said transaction. 
                                                        
128  Luiz op cit (n88) at 113/639; also reg 110 
 51 
5 SUPERMAJORITY SQUEEZE-OUTS 
 
 
5 1  Introduction 
 
 
This form of squeeze-out enables a majority shareholder, once he has obtained a 
supermajority threshold in a target company to squeeze out the remaining minority 
shareholders. The difference for this type and the tender-offer type is that the 
threshold is set at a certain holding of securities whereas the tender offer type 
requires a threshold in respect to the number acceptances given for an offer. The two 
types are similar in that in most cases they involve the same two-step transaction and 
can be used after the tender offer. As stated the critical difference is that the 
supermajority type is a pure form of controlled maintained form of squeeze-out 
mechanism. Once the certain level of threshold is obtained it is in the power of the 
board of the company to squeeze out the remaining shareholders subject however to 
further statutory or regulatory requirements.  
 
This form of squeeze-out is not provided for in the Act, as jurisdictions either have a 
tender offer type or a supermajority type of squeeze-out right. In this chapter the 
forms of supermajority squeeze outs used in the Delaware, German and New Zealand 
jurisdictions will be illustrated. A case will be made for the inclusion of a 
supermajority type of squeeze-out mechanism in the South African law as a result of 
issues arising out of the interplay of certain sections of the Act that can possibly 
prevent a supermajority owner of the ability to squeeze-out minority shareholders. 
 
5 2 United States Jurisdiction: Short-Form Merger 
 
 
In most of the leading commercial states in the US the statutes allow a majority 
shareholder with high enough ownership or shareholding, in Delaware and California 
for example a 90 per cent threshold is required,129 to approve a merger without a vote 
of the target company shareholders, although the target shareholders may exercise 
appraisal rights following the transaction.130 These form of mergers are known as 
                                                        
129 See s 263 of the DGCL and s 1110(b) of the California Corporation Code 
130 Gilson op cit (n35) at 1253 
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„tender offer freeze-outs‟ in that they usually happen in a two part transactions the 
first being the tender offer in order to obtain the threshold holding.  
 
The critical difference between a tender offer and the short form merger is the 
threshold required in order to enact the transaction. The short form merger threshold 
refers to the ownership of all outstanding shares in the target company131 whereas the 
tender offer squeeze out related to the threshold of acceptances of the shares that the 
offer relates to. The procedure to effect a short form merger in terms of s 253 of the 
DGCL is as follows: The board of directors of the parent company adopts a 
resolution providing for the merger and a „certificate of ownership and merger‟ is 
filed with the Secretary of State setting forth the fact that the parent owns at least 90 
per cent of the outstanding shares of each class of securities otherwise entitled to vote 
upon a merger of each of the subsidiaries involved and attaching a copy of the 
resolution. An agreement of merger is not used. The merger is effective upon filing of 
the certificate.132 
 
The merger is thus a unilateral act by the directors of the holding company. The 90 
per cent ownership applies only to classes that would be able to otherwise vote on the 
merger. 133  The process of determining the consideration terms begins when the 
controller informs the target board of its intention to freeze out the minority, and the 
target board responds by establishing a Special Committee (SC) of independent 
directors. The difference between the SC in long form mergers is that in long form 
mergers the SC has the power to can veto the transaction and in theory negotiate with 
the controller indefinitely. The SC of in a short form merger cannot veto a proposed 
                                                        
131 See s263 of the DGCL which provides: In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares 
of each class of the stock of a corporation or corporations (other than a corporation which has in its 
certificate of incorporation the provision required by § 251(g)(7)(i) of this title), of which class there 
are outstanding shares that, absent this subsection, would be entitled to vote on such merger, is owned 
by another corporation and … 
132 RF Balotti & JA Finkelstein „ The Delaware Law of Corporation & Business Organizations‟ 3rd ed 
(2009) at 9-34 
133 EP Welsch, AJ Turezyn RS Saunders „Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law: 
Fundamentals‟ 2015 Ed (2015) at 868  
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merger but must provide a recommendation134 whether to approve or not approve a 
merger within ten days.135 
 
The recourse provided to minorities to challenge the fairness of a proposed 
transaction is also different because the review is always on the standard of business 
judgement rule. It has been held that in short form mergers the minorities that „absent 
fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a minority 
shareholder who objects to a short form merger.‟136  This is different from the 
statutory merger grounds for establishing the standard of review. 
 
 
5 3 German Jurisdiction: Expulsion of Minority Shareholders 
 
 
The German jurisdiction provides for a squeeze out procedure based on a 
supermajority holding of a certain threshold registered share capital. This is known as 
the expulsion of minority shareholders procedure.137 The squeeze-out procedure, is 
not paralleled by any right of withdrawal and is not contingent on the making of a 
takeover bid as is the corresponding right in the tender offer squeeze-out 
mechanism.138  
 
According to s327a of the German Stock Corporation Act, the general meeting of a 
public limited liability company or a limited partnership with shares may, at the 
request of a shareholder who holds 95 per cent of the companies in capital, resolve 
that the shares of the other (minority) shareholders be transferred to the majority 
shareholder as against appropriate compensation. In determining the 95 per cent 
threshold the holder must control 95 per cent of the of the registered share capital, 
and does not include shares held by the company itself. 
 
                                                        
134 Known as a Schedule 14D-9 recommendation in terms of Section 14(d)(4) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act. 
135 Subramanian op cit (n18) at 22 
136  In re Unecol Exploraation Corporation Shareholders Litigation A.2d 329 (Del. Ch. 2000), 
Glassman v Unecoal Corporation 777 A.2d 242 (Del.Ch.2001) 
137 See s327a-327f of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) also G Wirth M Arnold R 
Morshauer M Greene „ Corporate Law in Germany‟ 2nd Ed (2002) at 545 – 548. 
138 See F Wooldridge The New German Takeover Act‟ 14 Eur Bus L Rev (2003) at 84 
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The majority shareholder does not have to hold the shares in person, for the purposes 
of determining, whether 95 per cent of the shares belong to the majority shareholder. 
Accordingly, the following shares will be imputed to the majority shareholder:  
Shares held by (other) undertakings if such undertakings are controlled by the 
majority shareholder.  Shares held by other undertakings on account of the majority 
shareholder; and If the majority shareholder is a sole proprietorship, shares which 
belong to the other property of such one-man-business. The law does not provide for 
special requirements to be met by the majority shareholder as such. Everyone who 
can be the bearer of rights can be a majority shareholder. Therefore, natural persons 
are comprised as well as legal persons, whether based on private or public law, 
associations of persons that can be bearers of rights as well as foreign entities.139 
 
The compensation is determined by the majority shareholder, who must be given the 
necessary information and documents by the executive board. The compensation is 
based on the market price of the shares. 
 
The „squeeze-out‟ takes effect once the resolution is entered in the Commercial 
Register. The resolution providing for it cannot be avoided on the ground that the 
majority shareholder has attempted to gain special benefits for himself, or that the 
compensation to be given is inadequate. However, application may be made by any 
minority shareholder to the competent court for the purpose of fixing such 
compensation.140 
 
 
5 4  New Zealand Jurisdiction: Dominant-Owner Squeeze-Out  
 
 
In the New Zealand corporate framework there are code companies, which are 
companies that are registered Companies Office Register of New Zealand 
Companies. If a corporate entity is not registered on that Companies Office Register, 
then it is not a Code Company. For example, unit trusts and overseas companies are 
                                                        
139 See S Simon F Schaumberg „Germany Squeeze-Out Guide IBA Corporate and M&A Law 
Committee 2010‟ available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=FFD62DFD-8004-4D14-8BF2-
06DFA126893A accessed on1 September 2015. 
140Woolridge op cit (n138) at 84 
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not Code Companies. In addition to being a New Zealand registered company, in 
order to meet the threshold of being a Code Company the company must have (or 
recently have had) listed shares that trade on the New Zealand Exchange or  have 50 
or more shareholders who hold Voting Rights (i.e., ordinary shares).141  
 
The Takeovers Code regulates the procedures for changes of control of Code 
Companies. The Takeovers Code includes rules for Compulsory Acquisition of the 
Shareholders‟ shares. Compulsory Acquisition means that a Shareholder (or two or 
more Shareholders acting together) who owns at least 90 per cent of all the shares can 
(or must) buy all of the rest of the shares. The Takeovers Code has rules about the 
price that has to be paid for these shares. A Shareholder who reaches the 90 per cent 
threshold in a Code Company is called a „Dominant Owner‟.142 
 
In achieving the dominant owner status the shareholder obtains a gerneral reight to 
obtain all the shares in the code company, as well as the minority shareholders have 
the right to sell their holdings to the major shareholders once he achieves the status as 
dominant owner.143  This can be seen as a squeeze-out right and a sell-out right 
respectively as consequence of having a supermajority holding in a company. 
 
The dominant owner has to notify the Code Company that the 90 per cent threshold 
was crossed. The Dominant Owner has to make a choice in respect to a compulsory 
sale and a voluntary sale.In a compulsory sale the Dominant Owner requires the 
remaining Shareholders to sell their shares to the Dominant Owner.  A voluntary sale 
the Dominant Owner asks the remaining Shareholders if they want to sell their 
shares, and if they do want to sell their shares then the Dominant Owner has to buy 
them.  
 
                                                        
141 See s3A of the Takeovers Code Approval 2000 of New Zealand (the Code) 
142 See the definition at s50 of the code which states: dominant owner, in relation to a code company, 
means a person who, after this code comes into force, becomes the holder or controller, or 2 or more 
per- sons acting jointly or in concert who, after this code comes into force, become the holders or 
controllers, of 90% or more of the voting rights in the code company (whether by reason of 
acceptances of an offer or otherwise)  
143 See s 52 & 53 of the Code 
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An intresting aspect to this squeeze out mechanism is the calculation of the 
consideration payable to the affected minority shareholders in a compulsury sale. In 
this respect the code makes a distinction between the controller becoming a dominant 
owner by virtue of acceptances of an offer and by an alternative method.  
 
In terms of Rule 56 if a person becomes a Dominant Owner by virtue of accpetances 
of a offer then the consideration to the remaining minority must be the same as in the 
offer provided it is an offer for equity securities in the same class. This only applies if 
the acceptances of the offer were received in respect of more than 50 per cent of the 
equity securities that were subject of the offer in the class which consideration is to 
be determined. 
 
The code however also make provision for whern a controller becomes a Dominant 
Owner by means other than in terms of a offer. In such a case determination of the 
consideration will then not be based on a offer. The consideration is then calculated 
as a cash sum certified as fair and reasonable by an independent adviser.144 
 
The minority shareholders may object to the calculation in the prescribed written 
manner whereafter the dominant have to refer the calculation to expert determination 
in terms of Rule 57(3). The consideration in those circumstances will be a cash sum 
equal to the fair and reasonable value of those securities. The expert determination 
must be calculated by the value of all the equity securities in the class of equity 
securities of which the equity security forms part, and allocating that value pro rata 
on all the securities of that class. The expert determination, made by an independent 
person appointed by the Takeovers Panel, must make the determination within 28 
days after his or her appointment.145 The Dominant Owner must pay the costs of the 
expert determination. Upon receipt of the expert determination the dominant owner 
must send a copy of it to the Takeovers Panel, to the New Zealand Exchange (if the 
Code Company is listed), and on request to any other person within one day of 
receipt of such a request.146 
                                                        
144 Rule 57(1)(a) of the Code 
145 Rule 58 of the Code 
146  R Falvey MER Watts ‘New Zealand Squeeze-out Guide IBA Corporate and M&A Law 
Committee 2010 available at: 
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5 5 Conclusion 
 
 
An issue arises from the interplay of sections of the Act in respect to a dominant 
controller arising not from a tender offer to squeeze-out minority shareholders. The 
controller in such an instance should be able to squeeze-out the minority by means of 
a fundamental transaction however the requirements of such a transaction is special 
resolution whereby the controllers votes will not be considered. This may give rise to 
the possibility of the minority preventing the controller to become 100 per cent owner 
or make the target company a wholly owned subsidiary. 
 
The alternative methods to achieve full ownership can be by amending the MOI in 
such a way to squeeze-out the minority shareholders. There will however be concerns 
with a direct squeeze-out by means of this method.147  
 
An indirect method can be achieved from the consolidation of shares that can lead to 
the squeeze-out of minority shareholders, also by means of reverse stock split. This 
method is however regulated by the JSE Listing Requirements148 and can possibly 
not work where there is a relatively large minority shareholding in this context. 
 
The best method of addressing this issue will be an introduction of a supermajority 
squeeze-out method. As in terms of the New Zealand model it can work in 
conjunction with the tender offer type or as per the US model it can be further 
method of merger arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
 http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=55A33019-8456-479A-A14F-
BE8D923DA3F2f, accessed 1 September 2015. 
147 It can lead to claims in terms of s165 of the Act relating to relief from prejudicial or oppressive 
conduct; also see Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432 
148 See „Odd Lot Holders‟ JSE Listing Requirements Rule 5.124, 18.1(o) 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The utility of a compulsory acquisition can best be illustrated through the application 
of the so-called going private transaction. The purpose of the going private 
transaction is for either the outside acquirer or controlling shareholder to make a 
public company private. In this way the controller takes the shares off the company 
off the market and can attempt to make the company more efficient in order at a later 
stage to sell the shares of a company on the market at a premium. 
 
This has been the function of private equity funds and forms an important part of the 
corporate framework which investors expects from the said framework. It serves two 
fundamental purposes firstly it allows a party to attempt to make a company more 
efficient or valuable without the regulatory burden of a public company and secondly 
it allows it do so without the market being aware of this. 
 
The compulsory acquisition provision ensures that such transaction is not impeded by 
an oppression of the minority shareholders by rejecting the proposed transaction. The 
said minority might not be able to prevent the transaction but can cause unnecessary 
impediments to complete the transaction. The said provision thus assists a party in 
finalising the transaction and where necessary assist to expropriate the shareholding 
of the small minority shareholders. 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to analyse whether the devices provided in the South 
African corporate framework to utilise the abovementioned tool of compulsory 
acquisitions was adequate to achieve the objective of compulsory acquisitions. The 
regulation surrounding the said devices was further analysed in order to ensure the 
fair treatment of the affected minority shareholders. 
 
In assessing the objective or basis of the compulsory it was found that it originated 
from the oppression of the minority in respect of takeover transactions that led to the 
codification of so called control-transfer squeeze-out devices. In further analysis it 
was found that justifications provided for theses devices can and should be afforded 
to controlling shareholders and not only outside acquirers of a company. The 
considerations are the same and through the development of minority shareholder 
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protection devices the squeeze out function should not be limited but also include 
control-maintained squeeze-out devices.  
 
In determination of the justification and objective of compulsory the focus shifted to 
determine whether the devices provided achieved these goals. In analysing the three 
main forms of squeeze-out devices utilised in jurisdictions the following issues in the 
current South African corporate framework where identified: 
 
i) The ‘class of shares’provision in the statutory tender offer squeeze-out  
 
The main objective of the compulsory acquisition provision is to provide the 
controller, or in the case of tender offer, the offeror if the threshold of acceptances 
was received to have full control of a company. The wording of the current s124 
however provides that the squeeze-out provision can be utilised to acquire full control 
of a class of shares and not in terms all the shareholding of a company. It is noted that 
there are different values for different classes of shares and that some offers may only 
relate to a certain class of share, however there should be qualifying provision in 
order to ensure that the squeeze-out can only be utilised when if it results in the full 
control to the offeror. 
 
ii) Proposal for a special committee of independent directors of a target 
company to bargain on behalf of shareholders in fundamental transaction 
squeeze-outs 
 
One of the purposes of takeover regulations is to ensure the fair treatment of the 
shareholders of a target company in takeover transactions. The shareholder appraisal 
remedy also attempts ensure fairness however cannot be seen as a protection device 
but rather a right afforded to minority shareholders.  
 
 In the South African context many devices are used such as the requirement of the 
opinion of an independent expert and the majority of the minority approval. The 
coercive nature of a squeeze-out transaction however may require a further element 
of a fiduciary duty on the directors owed to the minority shareholders to bargain on 
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their behalf. It is therefore proposed that the provision be made in the takeover 
regulations for the appointment of a special committee of independent directors of the 
target company, during proposed takeover transactions, to act on behalf of 
shareholders and has the ability to veto proposed transactions. 
 
iii) Proposal for a supermajority squeeze-out mechanism 
 
In the tender offer squeeze-out the device can only be utilised by an offeror who has 
received the threshold acceptances to her offer not including the offeror’s holding. 
Shareholders that do not include the shares held by the eventual acquirer in terms of 
the transaction must approve a takeover transaction by means of a fundamental 
transaction. 
 
This leaves a controlling shareholder who already has substantial holding vulnerable 
to oppression by the minority shareholders. In order squeeze-out the minority 
shareholders he will either require threshold acceptances to his offer or that the 
minority vote in favour of a takeover transaction. To allow or remedy such situation it 
is suggested that a shareholder having reached a certain level of equity holding 
should be able to squeeze-out the minority shareholders irrespective of how the 
controller obtained the level of shareholding. These devices are utilised in the 
jurisdictions as set out in chapter five. There are sufficient modern protection devices 
to ensure that the affected minority shareholders are treated fairly. 
 
The minority shareholders consisting of insignificant smallholding, should not 
prohibit the ability for parties to execute substantial commercial transactions, the law 
must enable this but also ensure that there is fair treatment on the affected minority 
shareholders.  
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